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THE NEW REQUIREMENT OF ENFORCEMENT
RELIANCE IN COMMERCIAL PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL:
SECTION 90 AS CATCH-22
SIDNEY W. DELONG*
Any comprehensive examination of recent appellate court decisions will disclose
that the legal doctrine of promissory estoppel has not become a significant source of
commercial contractual obligation. Although commercial promissory estoppel claims
are often made, plaintiff victories are very rare. These results are difficult to reconcile
with frequent scholarly contentions to the effect that contemporary courts have become
more receptive to claims of promissory estoppel and have liberalized its doctrinal
requirements. More important, the promisor behavior that is incidentally disclosed in
reported opinions also undermines academic arguments that rules providing for
promissory estoppel have commercial utility. The decisions suggest that most
commercial actors consider promissory estoppel liability as a risk to be avoided rather
than as a valuable opportunity to create contract obligations, and that they make efforts
to avoid it whenever possible. Indeed, a review of recent decisions shows that judicial
sympathy toward these efforts to avoid liability has begun to alter promissory estoppel
doctrine. In several jurisdictions a commercial promisee must now demonstrate what
can be called "enforcement reliance"-reliance on a reasonable belief in the legal
enforceability of the promise-in addition to mere "performance reliance"-reliance on
a reasonable belief that the promise will be performed. These decisions require that the
promisor not only make a reliance-inducing promise, but also clearly express an
intention to be legally bound. This article argues that the new requirement is an
appropriate default rule for non-bargain, commercial promises because it gives effect to
the parties' most probable motives and intentions concerning enforcement.
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a story about a revolution that wasn't. Section 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts was the first formal expression of promissory
estoppel as a contract doctrine of general application.' Although the
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School 1974; A.B., Vanderbilt University, 1969.
1. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) [hereinafter
FIRST RESTATEMENT]. The text of Section 90 does not use the term "promissory
estoppel" although commentary in the Second Restatement acknowledges its use.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (1979) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].
To many analysts, promissory estoppel appeared innovative in contrast to the
bargain principle of consideration, which developed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and was expressed in Section 75 of the First Restatement (now Section
71). See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 58-66 (1974) [hereinafter
GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT]. Corbin and others, however, believed reliance-based
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Restatement formulation was derived primarily from cases involving
family or charitable gift promises,2 courts soon began applying the
generalized language of Section 90 to commercial promises. In the
ensuing years, it was widely expected that promissory estoppel would
revolutionize commercial contract law by erasing the familiar
demarcations between enforceable and unenforceable promises that had
been drawn by the bargain theory of consideration and by introducing the
uncertainty of a new form of reliance-based, tort liability into contract
negotiations and relationships.3 .These predictions, however, failed to
obligation to be a consideration doctrine of more ancient lineage than the bargain
principle. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 194-195 (1952);
Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE
L.J. 343, 345 (1969) [hereinafter Henderson, Promissory Estoppel]; see also sources cited
infra note 56.
2. See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 678, 680 (1984) [hereinafter Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method].
Most of the cases relied upon by the drafters of the Restatement involved family gift
promises or charitable subscriptions, though a handful involved gratuitous bailments or
promises to insure in commercial settings. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90
illus. 1-4; Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Contracts Restatement No. 2, 4 A.L.I. PROC.
APPENDIX 61, 88-111 (1926) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (reporting drafters' discussion
of Section 88, which later became Section 90). The Second Restatement drafters
discussed numerous hypotheticals, including an uncle's promise to give his nephew Johnny
$1,000, id. at 88-93, 95-96, 99, 101-05, 110-11; a promise to pay money if the donee
would complete college, id. at 87, 109; an uncle's promise to pay his nephew's expenses
for a trip to Europe, id. at 88; and a promise to make a gift of Blackacre to Johnny, who
builds improvements on it, id. at 99, 104. The discussion also alluded to the family gift
cases of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) and DeCicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807
(N.Y. 1917). PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 104-05. The application of Section 90 to
commercial promises was probably unanticipated. See GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT,
supra note 1, at 66. By the time of the Second Restatement, however, the comments and
illustrations to Section 90 acknowledged its application to commercial promises. SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90 cmts. b & e; Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of
Promissory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263, 1266 (1994) [hereinafter Pham,
Waning].
3. E.g., GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 87-91; Warren A.
Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913
(1951) [hereinafter Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises]; Warren L. Shattuck,
Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REV. 908, 944 (1937) [hereinafter
Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises]; Note, Contracts-Promissory Estoppel, 20 VA. L. REV.
214 (1933) [hereinafter Note, Contracts-Promissory Estoppel]; cf Henderson,
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 1, at 358-60 (arguing that application of promissory
estoppel in the commercial context will shape the evolution of the bargain and assent
principles of contract law); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The
Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981) ("[Tlhe principle
of [S]ection 90 ... has become perhaps the most radical and expansive development of
this century in the law of promissory liability.").
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make allowance for a widespread defensive reaction to the doctrinal
novelty. 4  Once commercial actors became aware of Section 90, they
responded by implementing legal strategies designed to reduce or
eliminate the new risk of promissory liability. Judicial receptivity to this
adaptive response has now begun to reshape promissory estoppel doctrine.
This Article reports on the current state of the co-evolution of legal
strategy and legal doctrine by analyzing how Section 90 is being
interpreted in the courts.5  For several years now, well-counseled
commercial promisors have known how to take legally effective measures
to avoid Section 90 liability during the negotiation and performance of
contracts.6 More recently, courts in several jurisdictions have begun to
modify the reliance element of promissory estoppel so as to require the
promisee to demonstrate a reasonable and foreseeable belief that the
promise in question was legally enforceable.7 As will be seen, this is a
difficult hurdle for a commercially sophisticated party to surmount. The
concerted effort by lawyers and judges to limit commercial promissory
liability to formal contract commitments is returning the commercial
world to its pre-Section 90 tranquility.
These developments suggest that a reappraisal of Section 90 is
appropriate. If it is conceptualized as a rule of contract law, then
promissory estoppel should find its ultimate justification in the mutual
benefits it confers on potential trading partners.8 It should, in other
words, be an economically efficient9 rule that all parties to a transaction
would prefer to submit to, ex ante. Yet commercial actors seem not to
appreciate the advantages they gain from this doctrine. Judged by their
persistent efforts to avoid estoppel liability, and by the absence of any
4. But see Henderson, Promissory Estoppel, supra note 1, at 387 (speculating that
the next stage in the development of Section 90 would turn on policy considerations
relating to bargain context of reliance claims). Later commentators were better placed to
observe this phenomenon. See, e.g., Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The
Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS
L. REV. 472, 550 (1983) [hereinafter Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory
Estoppel] (describing tactics that promisors may use to avoid estoppel-based liability).
5. "There is only one way to record accurately the progress of any branch of the
law over a period of time; that is to review all of the cases and statutes affecting it that
have been litigated or enacted during the period." Arthur L. Corbin, Recent
Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 449, 449 (1937). This survey
obviously falls far short of Corbin's ideal, focusing as it does primarily on appellate
opinions.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part V.C.
8. See infra Part V.D.
9. See GORDON TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 35-47 (1971), reprinted in




evidence that they are deliberately using the rule to structure promissory
obligations, promissory estoppel does not appear to be an efficient rule.
This Article contends that the appropriate rule for commercial
parties-one that is suggested by recent decisions-is that a reliance-
inducing, non-bargain promise should be unenforceable in the absence of
the promisor's clear expression of a specific intention to incur legal
liability. In that one narrow exception, however, enforcement seems
clearly warranted if the promisee actually relies on the promise.
This thesis directly contradicts prevailing academic opinion, both
descriptively and normatively. In the past two decades, several scholars
have proclaimed that promissory estoppel has achieved a dominant role
in commercial transactions and has done so as a contract doctrine rather
than as a tort doctrine. Some theorists claim that Section 90 has evolved
into a new mode of contract formation that is free of both the
technicalities of the consideration doctrine and the vestigial reliance
requirement inherited from equitable estoppel.10 Other theorists imply
that Section 90 has become a method that, like the doctrine of offer and
acceptance, commercial parties can use for the deliberate creation of legal
obligations." Still others, applying economic reasoning that supports
enforcement of bargain promises,12 contend that enforcement of non-
10. See infra Part mH.
11. See Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996)
[hereinafter Barnett, Death of Reliance]; Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond
Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987) [hereinafter Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance]
(contending that promissory estoppel is applied when the promisor has manifested consent
to be legally bound and in cases of misrepresentation); Mary E. Becker, Promissory
Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 133-35 (1987) [hereinafter Becker,
Promissory Estoppel Damages] (arguing that promissory estoppel liability is contractual
because the promisor manifests an objective intent to be legally bound); Daniel A. Farber
& John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible
Handshake, " 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (i985) [hereinafter Farber & Matheson, Invisible
Handshake] (arguing that enforcement of non-bargain, reliance-inducing commercial
promises aids commercial promisors by building trust); Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory
of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An
Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895 (1987) [hereinafter Kostritsky, A New
Theory] (explaining that promissory estoppel can be used to create legal obligations where
barriers exist to formal bargain contract); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory
Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) [hereinafter Yorio & Thel, The Promissory
Basis of Section 90] (asserting that promissory estoppel enforces promises because of the
moral obligation of promise, not reliance).
12. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48
STAN. L. REv. 481,490-91 (1996) [hereinafter Craswell, Efficient Reliance]; Avery Katz,
When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary
Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996) [hereinafter Katz, When Should an Offer Stick
?]; Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
Section 90 as Catch-22
bargain, commercial promises under Section 90, reduces transaction costs
and encourages efficient levels of promisee reliance. 3
These lines of argument all imply that rational, self-interested
commercial actors attach a positive value to the capacity to bind
themselves by informal, non-bargain promises. 4 But every sign that can
be gleaned from the appellate reports suggests that commercial actors
overwhelmingly prefer to order their legal affairs via the well-worn
channels of formal bargain contract and that they consider their potential
liability under Section 90 to be more a dangerous pitfall than a valuable
opportunity. The behavior of these commercial promisors casts serious
doubt on the virtues of Section 90 as a contract device.
Part II of this Article describes the two forms of promisee reliance
that a commercial promise might induce and that Section 90 might
protect: performance reliance and enforcement reliance. While the law
could theoretically enforce all promises that foreseeably induce a promisee
to rely on their performance, such a rule would be overbroad. Virtually
all promises in the commercial world are made in order to induce
performance reliance but not all promises are enforceable. 5 Promisors
and promisees benefit from a legal regime that permits both enforceable
and unenforceable reliance-inducing promises to be made, at the
promisor's option.
Most published economic analysis of Section 90 tends to assume that
legal enforcement will be efficient whenever the promisee's reliance is
beneficial or efficient and that the parties would prefer such a rule, ex
ante, in order to minimize transaction costs. 6 But this "hypothetical
bargain" approach conflicts with empirical evidence of actual behavior.
Outside the context of formal bargain promises, commercial promisors are
usually satisfied with the simple level of performance reliance that is
induced by unenforceable promises. While economic analysis
persuasively supports a legal rule that would enable promisors to choose
to make designated non-bargain promises legally enforceable, it cannot
411, 412, 418-19 (1977) [hereinafter Posner, Gratuitous Promises].
13. See, e.g., Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12; Katz, When Should an
Offer Stick?, supra note 12.
14. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12; Farber & Matheson, Invisible
Handshake, supra note 11. By contrast, one would not expect commercial parties
willingly to submit to rules of tort law, ex ante, although in some cases they might.
15. Compare SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90 cmt. a (reliance is the
basis of enforcement), with id. cmt. b (only certain reliance is protected).
16. See, e.g., Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12; Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
L.J. 1261, 1265 (1980) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises]; Katz, When
Should an Offer Stick?, supra note 12.
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demonstrate that efficiency is served by enforcing all of the promises
described by Section 90.
Part III considers the claim made by two popular non-economic
theories of promissory estoppel that actual reliance is not, and should not
be, necessary to a claim under Section 90. The promise and consent
theories of contract law each reject the view that Section 90 is a tort-like
rule,' 7 concerned with deterrence and compensation for promisees who
are injured by their foreseeable reliance on broken promises. Instead,
they conceive of Section 90 as a contract doctrine," providing an
alternative to bargain promise as a way to structure a legal obligation. 9
They contend that contemporary judicial treatment of Section 90 permits
the creation of contractual obligation by promise alone, without the
necessity of either bargained-for consideration or actual reliance.
Using a survey of all of the promissory estoppel cases reported in
1995 and 1996, I will challenge the descriptive claims that underlie these
theories. Contemporary courts rigorously enforce Section 90's
requirement that the promise induce actual reliance by the promisee.
These courts do not enforce promises that satisfy only the simplified
17. See Barnett, Death of Reliance, supra note 11, at 521-25; Farber & Matheson,
Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 945 ("With the decline of reliance, promissory
estoppel is moving away from tort law."); Kostritsky, A New Theory, supra note 11, at
905. Most other commentators have analyzed Section 90 as, at least in part, a tort
doctrine. E.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 146
(1990) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS]; GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra
note 1, at 97 (referring to promissory estoppel as "quasi-tort" liability); SAMUEL
WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 99-
100, 1338 (rev. ed. 1937); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel, supra note 1, at 345-47
(explaining that promissory estoppel is not a consideration doctrine designed to protect
exchange, but an estoppel doctrine designed to protect reliance); Metzger & Phillips, The
Emergence of Promissory Estoppel, supra note 4, at 506-07, 547; Seavey, Reliance Upon
Gratuitous Promises, supra note 3, at 925-28; Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises, supra note
3, at 944 (arguing that the purpose of enforcement under Section 90 is compensation of
injurious reliance, not the enforcement of the promise); Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory
Estoppel as Tort, 35 IOWA L. REV. 28, 31 (1949) (contending that bargained-for
consideration is the essence of contract); see also Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133
N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (holding that promises too indefinite to constitute a contract
offer can lead to liability for promissory estoppel and that promissory estoppel is not a
substitute for consideration).
18. E.g., Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 905
("[P]romissory estoppel is being transformed into a new theory of distinctly contractual
obligation."); see also SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90 cmt. d ("A promise
binding under this section is a contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies
is often appropriate.").
19. E.g., Kostritsky, A New Theory, supra note 11, at 902 (positing that
promissory estoppel and other orthodox doctrines are "merely substitute doctrinal methods
for showing the assent required for an enforceable consensual exchange.").
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grounds of enforceability proposed by the promise and consent theorists,
i.e., serious promises made in furtherance of a commercial objective.
The evidence of contemporary practice that can be gleaned from
these cases also casts serious doubt on the normative arguments of the
consent and promise theorists, who contend that prima facie legal
enforceability of non-bargain, business-related promises would facilitate
commercial exchanges and give effect to promisors' actual or probable
intention to be legally bound. Contemporary commercial practice instead
implies that this suggestion would be an inefficient default rule because
most commercial promisors would probably contract around it.'
Part IV examines the recent growth of a requirement of enforcement
reliance in three commercial contexts in which courts appear to have
added to the text of Section 90 a requirement that a commercial promisee
show that she relied on the legal enforceability of the promise rather than
the likelihood that it would be performed. This trend can be seen in the
persistent refusal to enforce oral promises of permanent employment; in
the judicial enforcement of disclaimers designed to forestall liability under
Section 90; and, in the imputation to commercial promisees of knowledge
that some non-bargain promises are formally unenforceable and hence
unreliable for Section 90 purposes. By requiring promisees to
demonstrate enforcement reliance, these courts preserve a role for the
unenforceable commercial promise and preserve promisor choice.
The new requirement that a successful claimant demonstrate a
reasonable belief that the non-bargain promise he relied upon was legally
enforceable when made threatens to transform Section 90 from a
commercially useful rule into a meaningless paradox, akin to a Catch-22.
A commercial promisee who is legally sophisticated enough to take
Section 90 into account in making a reliance decision would also be
expected to know that non-bargain, commercial promises are generally
unenforceable. Such a promisee could never satisfy the new test, unless
courts also recognize a new category of potential contract obligation.
They could do this by enforcing reliance-inducing promises that are made
with an expressed intention that they be legally enforceable. A
promisee's reliance on that expression would constitute enforcement
reliance.
The rarity of successful claims for promissory estoppel in the sample
demonstrates a systematic exclusion of promissory estoppel from the
commercial world.2  Far from causing the death of contract, Section 90
20. See infra Part H.
21. See infra Part I. I follow several others in noting the rarity of successful
claims for promissory estoppel and the judicial hostility to the theory. Robert A. Hillman,
The Triumph of Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 32, 39-40 (1995);
Amy H. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and Irony in Contract Theories, 90 Nw.
9491997:943
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has itself been virtually extinguished from much of the commercial
landscape by the reactive adaptation of the bar and the bench. I contend
that there is little reason to regret its demise.
II. ENFORCEMENT RELIANCE AND PERFORMANCE RELIANCE
A. A Promisor-Choice Model of Contract Enforcement
My analysis is grounded on the normative premise that
commercial 2 non-bargain promises, like bargain promises, should be
given legal enforcement under Section 90 solely in order to facilitate
exchange.' Whether enforcement of any category of promise will have
this effect depends on the interrelation of the effects of promisee reliance,
U. L. REV. 132, 135-37 (1995) (noting that only two out of forty-five reported promissory
estoppel cases in New York affirm judgments for plaintiffs); Pham, Waning, supra note
2, at 1263 ("Courts' extreme reluctance to grant recovery under promissory estoppel
indicates a continued adherence to traditional contract principles of bargained-for
exchange.").
22. This Article thus has no necessary application to the enforcement of non-
commercial promises under Section 90. It may be that assumptions about the power and
legal knowledge of non-commercial actors would lead to different conclusions than those
I reach. There may also be other reasons for enforcing certain non-commercial promises.
23. Most scholars agree that bargain promises are legally enforced in order to
increase the gains available through trade. Enforceability encourages promisees to enter
into bargain contracts by reducing their risk of disappointed reliance. See SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 72 cmt. b.; Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12,
at 492; Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11; L.L. Fuller & William
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61-63
(1936) [hereinafter Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest]; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing
Promises, supra note 16, at 1265; Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration,
58 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 941 (1958). Under this rationale, the enforcement of bargain
promises reduces the transaction costs, including credit risks, that parties would otherwise
incur in non-instantaneous or non-simultaneous exchanges. See, e.g., SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch. 16 Reporter's Note; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 3-5 (1979); K.N. Llewellyn,
Contract: Institutional Aspects, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 329, 330-
31 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1931); Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance
Interest, supra, at 60-61. The facilitation of trade may also result from enforcement of
some non-bargain commercial promises ancillary to the creation of bargain contracts, as
in the case of options. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 495-99; Farber &
Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra
note 16; Kostritsky, A New Theory, supra note 11.
This Article does not consider arguments for promissory estoppel based on
deontological principles, corrective justice principles, or other non-consequentialist
grounds. Non-consequentialist arguments generally have difficulty in developing
principled justifications for the non-enforcement of reliance-inducing promises and thus
imply a scope for legal intervention that many would find to be overbroad.
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the rules of legal enforceability, and the parties' awareness of those rules.
This relation has been remarked upon in passing by other promissory
estoppel theorists, but it has not usually been given full weight in the
associated analysis.'
Promising and Relying. A promise is a speech act that commits the
promisor to act or refrain from acting in a specified way' and makes
him 26 in some way answerable if he fails to do so. This Article is
premised on the contention that the sole rationale for making a
commercial promise is to induce the promisee to react to the commitment
made by the promisor.27 More specifically, self-interested commercial
actors make a commercial promise for only two reasons: to "sell" the
promise in a bargained-for exchange or to induce the promisee to rely in
some way on the promisor's commitment to perform a non-bargain
24. The notable exceptions to this generalization are Goetz & Scott, Enforcing
Promises, supra note 16, and, more recently, building on their work, Craswell, Efficient
Reliance, supra note 12.
25. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2(1) ("A promise is a manifestation
of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."). A speech act is a
statement that performs some conventionally recognized deed, such as promising,
threatening, christening, etc. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS: THE
WILLIAM JAMES LECTURES DELIVERED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN 1955, at 4-11 (J.O.
Urmson & Marina Sbisa eds., 2d ed. 1975) (describing performative statements); JOHN
R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, 54-62 (1970)
[hereinafter SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS] (describing the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the speech act of promising); Peter M. Tiersma, Comment, The Language of Offer and
Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 189 (1986)
[hereinafter Tiersma, Language of Offer and Acceptance].
Some economic analysis seems to ignore the commitment a promise creates. In
their economic analysis of Section 90, Goetz and Scott describe promises solely as
information: "The promise itself is merely the production of a piece of information about
the future." Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at 1267. As mere
information, however, promises are indistinguishable from representations of fact about
a promisor's intention, representations that could just as well be made by informed third
parties. But as Section 2 of the Second Restatement provides, promises are also legally
operative speech acts committing the promisor to act. See also Tiersma, Language of
Offer and Acceptance, supra (effect of offer and acceptance is to create a commitment by
the speaker). Promises are distinguishable from purely informational statements of the
speaker's present intention. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. e.
26. As a convention, this Article will use the feminine pronoun for promisees and
the masculine for promisors.
27. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 81-83
(1979) [hereinafter ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT] (explicating the
18th century views of Hume and Smith); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 276 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory]
("[E]very promisor should reasonably expect to induce reliance."); Pham, Waning, supra
note 2, at 1286.
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promise.' While it is possible that a social promise might be made for
other reasons,29 the "point" of communicating a commercial promise to
the promisee can only be to achieve one of these goals. This Article
concerns only non-bargain promises. Rational commercial promisors will
make non-bargain promises only when their expected benefit from the
promisee's anticipated reliance exceeds the expected cost of making the
promise, including the expected cost of performance and any potential
liability for breach.' Self-interest also explains the reliance that such
promises actually induce. In non-legal understanding, a promisee's
reliance on a promise can be defined as any choice she makes because of
a belief that the promise will be performed under circumstances in which
the performance of the promise will be beneficial to her interests or
28. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 487 (referring only to
enforceable commitments); Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at 1266-67
(explaining that the function of promise is adaptation by the promisee). Promisee reliance
is implicit in the Restatement definition of "promise," which is couched in terms of the
promisee's understanding. See supra note 25.
29. There may be other social or psychological motives behind a non-commercial
promise, for example, to create or reinforce a valuable personal relationship, to fulfill a
traditional or conventional expectation, or to act as a precommitment strategy for the
promisor.
30. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 495-97. The most common
type of benefit to a commercial promisor from a promisee's reliance on a non-bargain
promise is the facilitation of a subsequent exchange transaction with the promisee: non-
bargain promises lead to bargain promises. A classic example is the option contract, in
which a promisor gratuitously promises to keep an offer open for a period of time during
which the promisee can investigate whether to accept. For application of promissory
estoppel to an option contract otherwise unsupported by consideration, see Strata Prod.
Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1996). Option contracts are
referred to as "firm offers" in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
provides that they are enforceable without consideration if contained in a signed writing.
See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1995). The economic analysis of the enforceability of option
contracts can be found in Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, and Katz, When
Should an Offer Stick?, supra note 12.
Closely related is the "no-shop" promise made by a company to a potential buyer,
promising not to negotiate for its sale until the buyer has had time to perform a due
diligence examination and arrange financing for a bid. See infra Part IV.D (discussing
Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Margaux, Inc., 674 A.2d 889 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996)).
In each case, the promise-to hold the offer open, to refrain from negotiations-may
be "gratuitous" but is aimed at an exchange transaction. Whether or not a bargain is the
ultimate goal, however, I will assume that all non-bargain, commercial promises are made
in order to induce reliance beneficial to the promisor.
A related goal of commercial promising is the hope of reciprocity in favor-giving.
A commercial party may be able to offer a promise of a benefit to another party in the
hope and expectation of receiving a return of some sort in the future. One could consider
this type of promise as an implicit bargain promise.
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desires.3' In the paradigmatic case, the promisee will be better off if she
relies and the promise is performed, and worse off if she relies and the
promise is breached, than she would be if she did not rely at all.32
Given the uncertainty about whether the promise will be performed,
therefore, a promisee who relies on a promise takes a risk in order to
obtain a benefit.33
That risk is altered by legal enforceability. Two types of reliance are
possible within a legal system that differentiates between enforceable and
unenforceable promises. When a promisor makes a promise that the
promisee recognizes to be unenforceable, the promise can induce only
"performance reliance." The promisee relies solely on her estimate of the
likelihood that the promisor will perform, without any expectation of a
legal remedy if the reliance is disappointed. The promisee decides
whether and how much to rely by assessing the promisor's honesty and
reliability, the circumstances bearing on the probability of performance
and breach, the benefits that reliance followed by performance would
confer, and the costs that disappointed reliance would impose.' These
factors determine the expected value of reliance on the promise.
If, however, the promisor makes a promise that the promisee
recognizes to be legally enforceable, then the promise will induce what
I will refer to as "enforcement reliance." The promisee relies both on the
credibility of the promise and on the belief that she will have a legal
remedy for some or all of the costs of disappointed reliance if the promise
is not performed. The expected value of an enforceable promise is
greater than that of an otherwise identical unenforceable one because of
two distinct effects of enforceability: (1) the exposure to a damages award
tends to deter a promisor from breaching,35 which makes performance
31. Cf SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 25, at 58 ("A promise is defective if
the thing promised is something the promisee does not want done.. ").
32. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 490; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing
Promises, supra note 16, at 1264.
33. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 490; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing
Promises, supra note 16, at 1264.
34. Goetz and Scott point out that even reliance on uncertain promises is
reasonable in terms of expected value if the benefit of performance is high in relation to
the cost of disappointment. Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at 1270-
71 & n.27, 1306 n. 107 (describing how reliance on a promise known to be unenforceable
may be reasonable on the basis of expected value, though courts do not so characterize
it).
35. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest, supra note 23, at 61 & n.12
(stating that damages for breach of contract may in part be justified by deterrence of
breach). The effect of enforceability is actually somewhat more complex because the
promisor's manifested willingness to make an enforceable promise also signals to the
promisee that the promisor is confident of performance. This inference arises because the
promisor can be presumed to assess the potential costs of breach and enforcement as less
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more probable, and (2) the potential indemnification for loss makes
disappointment less costly. In a system that permits the promisee to sue
for damages for breach, these two effects, of course, are interrelated
because the deterrence effect depends on the likelihood that a disappointed
promisee will make a damages claim.
By increasing the expected value of a promise to the promisee,
enforceability permits the commercial promisor to offer a stronger
inducement to the promisee to rely in a way that will benefit the
promisor.36 But enforceability also makes the promise more costly to
the promisor, who incurs the additional risk of legal liability for
breach. 3" A promisor must decide whether the expected benefits of the
increased promisee reliance induced by enforceability exceed its expected
costs. If the costs of enforceability exceed its benefits to the promisor,
he may prefer to make an unenforceable promise. An unenforceable
promise is less costly to the promisor and entails a lower degree of
commitment, and so is also less effective in inducing a promisee's
reliance. A promisor's refusal to make a promise enforceable indicates
that the expected cost of enforceability exceeds the expected benefit to the
promisor of the additional reliance that enforceability will induce.
Nevertheless, legally unenforceable promises are made and intended to
induce reliance on this lower degree of commitment.
This idealized account rests on the assumption that both parties can
distinguish enforceable from unenforceable promises. While a promisor-
choice model obviously requires promisors to understand how to make
promises enforceable or unenforceable, it also requires promisees to be
able to recognize the difference. Indeed, none of the extra benefits of
enforcement reliance will accrue to the promisor unless the promisee
actually believes that the promise is enforceable when deciding whether
to rely. A promisee who is unaware that the promise is legally
enforceable will rely only at the level justified by the promisor's intrinsic
than the benefits of reliance. The signaling effect can reduce "bonding" costs that the
promisor might otherwise incur in reassuring the promisee that the promise will be
performed. See id.; see also Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11.
36. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 495-501. In the non-
commercial world, enforceability also increases the value of a gratuitous promise as a gift.
See Posner, Gratuitous Promises, supra note 12, at 412, 418-19 (arguing that
enforceability increases the utility of the promise to the promisee and permits the promisor
to give a more valuable gift at lower cost); see also Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises,
supra note 16.
37. The risk of enforceability is an expected cost to the promisor. See Posner,
Gratuitous Promises, supra note 12; see also Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra
note 16, at 1264. The expected cost of this increased liability depends on the promisor's
estimate of the likelihood of performance. If he is, for example, highly confident of
performance, then it will cost him little to make the promise enforceable.
Section 90 as Catch-22
credibility, though the promisor will incur the extra cost imposed by the
risk of breach and remedy. 3' A promisor has no motive to make a
(more costly) enforceable promise that the promisee does not realize is
enforceable at the time of reliance. To obtain the benefits of
enforceability in the form of greater reliance by the promisee, the
promisor must communicate the fact of enforceability to the promisee.
If the legal rule of enforceability is uncertain or the promisee is not fully
aware, the promisor has an incentive to incur at least some level of cost
in communicating information about the enforceability of his promise.39
Otherwise he will not receive the higher level of reliance that his promise
has earned.
Under a promisor-choice model of contracting, a promisor's intention
to induce foreseeable reliance does not imply that he intends to incur an
enforceable obligation: he may be seeking to induce only performance
reliance. Thus, in deciding what overt signs one should use to identify
enforceable commercial promises, it would be inaccurately overbroad to
use a promisor's mere manifestation of an intention to induce reliance.'
Conversely, a promisee's reliance on the likelihood that a promise will be
performed is not equivalent to her reliance on its enforceability; nor is the
disappointment or harm that follows non-performance a sufficient reason
for enforcement.4"
38. Potential enforcement costs exist if the promisor anticipates that he will be
sued for breach if the promisee discovers the legal basis of her claim after breach.
Enforceability would otherwise impose no expected cost on the promisor.
39. Conversely, the promisor will benefit if the promisee mistakenly believes an
unenforceable promise to be enforceable. Such a promisor has an incentive to
misrepresent or conceal the unenforceable nature of the promise at some cost.
40. While this point may seem obvious, several theorists have assumed that a
promisor's apparent willingness to induce a promisee to rely on a promise is, or should
be, considered a manifestation by the promisor of his consent that the promise be legally
enforceable. See ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 27,
at 652-59; Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27; Becker, Promissory Estoppel
Damages, supra note 11, at 133; Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12; Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest, supra note 23, at 58 (implying that enforcement is justified
in order to protect any reliance that has social utility); Pham, Waning, supra note 2, at
1285-86; Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 115, 167.
But cf. State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993) (Riley, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that to enforce any promise that induces reliance is to make all
promises enforceable).
41. As Fuller and Perdue recognized:
T]he policy in favor of facilitating reliance can scarcely be extended to all
promises indiscriminately. Any such policy must presuppose that reliance in
the particular situation will normally have some general utility. Where we are
dealing with "exchanges" or "bargains" it is easy to discern this utility since
such transactions form the very mechanism by which production is organized
in a capitalistic society. There seems no basis for assuming any such general
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My analysis of the appropriate role of promissory estoppel in the
commercial world thus proceeds from the following assumptions:
1. If it is to be justified as an element of contract law,
Section 90 must facilitate trade by offering to trading
parties a legal capacity that they would, ex ante, both
prefer to have.42
2. Both performance reliance and enforcement reliance
can facilitate trade. The promisor should have the
legal power to choose which form of reliance he
intends to induce, based on his assessment of the
relative costs and benefits of enforceability.43 Legal
conventions should enable a promisor to make any
commercial promise clearly and expressly enforceable
or unenforceable, at a minimum cost."
utility in the promises coming under [Section] 90, since they are restricted
only by a negative definition-they are not bargains.
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest, supra note 23, at 65; see also Morris R. Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 579-80 (1933) (contending that reliance
alone does not explain why some promises are enforced and others are not).
42. P.S. Atiyah describes the paradigm model of contract as follows:
The law of contract, it is said, consists of power-conferring rules. The law
provides facilities for private parties to make use of them if they so wish.
Those who wish to create legal obligations have only to comply with a simple
set of rules and the result will be recognised by the law.
P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 LAW Q. REV. 193, 195
(1978) [hereinafter Atiyah, Law of Obligations]. While this assumption holds for some
of the rules of contract law, it does not hold for all of them. Regardless of wealth or
power disparities, there are some rules of contract law that both parties would want to be
binding on themselves, ex ante, such as that bargain promises are legally enforceable and
are created by certain conventional forms. Each party would want to be bound by his
promises as well as to bind the other. But a powerful party might not want the doctrines
of duress or unconscionability to apply to himself ex ante. Each party would have reason
to wish the other party subject to such rules but would have no reason to desire to have
itself subject to such rules.
43. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 483 (explaining that the
rules of contract formation should give effect to the parties' likely intentions); Henderson,
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 1, at 357 ("The general objective of these assorted rules
[of offer and acceptance in contract law] is to guarantee parties seeking an exchange
extensive freedom to express, or to refuse to express, a willingness to be bound.").
44. Legal commentators of many different theoretical orientations have affirmed
the value of a rule permitting promisors to make their promises legally binding by making
some unambiguous sign of enforceability, as was once the case with the seal. For
example, in commenting on proposed Section 80 and a proposal that a written recital of
payment of a nominal consideration would render a promise enforceable, Williston stated:
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3. The success of an enforcement regime such as this
depends on promisee awareness of both legal rules and
the conventional signs of enforceability.
Enforceability is valueless to the promisor unless it is
known to the promisee when she decides to rely or to
purchase the promise.
This idealized model of contract behavior emphasizes the utility of
permitting promisors to choose from a range of reliance-inducing
commitments-from no promise, to unenforceable promise, to enforceable
promise-and of a judicial practice that respects these choices. A model
premised on the utility of promisor choice implies that, notwithstanding
conventional doctrines of consideration, a commercial promise should be
legally enforceable or unenforceable in accordance with any clear
manifestation to the promisee of such an intention.
How then should such an idealized law deal with non-bargain
commercial promises made without an express manifestation by the
promisor of an intent that they be enforceable? On the assumption that
the promisor and promisee will be aware of the applicable rule, this
question simply seeks the default rule for interpretation of such promises.
There are several plausible candidates. Such promises could all be
enforceable, or all unenforceable, or enforceable only under certain
conditions, e.g., if made in conjunction with a request for reliance.
Bearing in mind that the utility of enforcement depends on promisee
awareness, one might surmise that the choice of a default rule should turn
on the frequency with which promisors intend their non-bargain promises
to be understood to be enforceable, which is an empirical question. I
contend that, as a matter of fact, commercial promisors rarely want their
non-bargain promises to be legally enforceable and that when they do,
[Ilt produces the result that I have spoken of and which I deem very desirable,
that where seals have been abolished as they have been in so many states,
parties nevertheless can make a binding promise to give a house [in return for
a dollar], if they so intend, without exacting consideration which is equivalent
or supposed to be so.
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 73; see also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 39 (1981) [hereinafter FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE]; Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 310-12; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing
Promises, supra note 16, at 1278 n.41; Posner, Gratuitous Promises, supra note 12, at
419-20. Often this sentiment is expressed as a view that consideration is itself a mere
formality. See Krell v. Codman, 28 N.E. 578 (Mass. 1891) (Holmes, J.); OLIVER W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (Mark D. Howe ed., Belknap Press 1963) (1881) ("A
consideration may be given and accepted, in fact, solely for the purpose of making a
promise binding."); Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra note 11, at 450
("[C]onsideration is a formality much like the formality of the sealed instrument.").
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they clearly express such an intention. From the promisor's perspective,
such an expression is essential to the promisee's awareness of
enforceability that is, in turn, essential to any benefit to the promisor
resulting from enforcement reliance. Promisors have an economic motive
to inform the promisee of enforceability in order to induce the higher
level of reliance that enforceability warrants. They do not have a
comparable motive to inform the promisee of non-enforceability. Because
a rule of non-enforcement in the absence of an expression of
enforceability would coincide with promisor incentives, it would reduce
the transaction costs of contracting around it and would for that reason be
more efficient than its opposite. It is thus the thesis of this Article that
Section 90 should be used to enforce only those reliance-inducing
promises that are accompanied by an expression by the promisor that he
intends that the promise be legally enforceable.
B. Section 90 and Enforceability
The idealized model of promisor choice only imperfectly represents
contract doctrine as it exists today. Section 90 in particular appears to
reduce the commercial promisor's options by effacing much of the
distinction between enforceable and unenforceable promises. Under
Section 90:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person [which we have seen includes virtually all
commercial promises] and which does induce such action or
forbearance [as virtually all commercial promisors intend] is
binding [i.e. enforceable] if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise.' 5
The "avoidance of injustice" element is all that prevents Section 90
from making all relied-upon, commercial promises enforceable, and
thereby eliminating mere performance reliance from the commercial
world. In addressing the question of what it means to say that
enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice, the comments to Section 90
direct the court to base its decision on:
the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance, on its definite and
substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on the
formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to
45. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90(1).
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which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling
functions of form are met by the commercial setting or
otherwise, and on the extent to which such other policies as the
enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment
are relevant.46
This multi-factor test may accomplish many things, but it fails to
give controlling effect to promisor choice or promisee understanding
about the intended enforceability of the promise. A commercial promise
might satisfy all of these criteria and nevertheless be both intended and
understood to create no legal liability. Such is the case when a highly
formalized promise is accompanied by an express disclaimer of
enforceability: most courts will not enforce such a promise even if the
promisee reasonably relies on performance.47 Although the possibility
of disclaiming enforceability does not appear in the text of Section 90,
most courts hold that justice does not require enforcement of a relied-
upon promise under circumstances in which a reasonable promisee would
have believed that she would have no legal remedy for breach. 4  By
refusing to protect pure performance reliance in disclaimer cases, these
courts implicitly affirm that enforcement reliance is essential to an action
under Section 90.
A frequent objection to a requirement of enforcement reliance,
however, is that it would introduce a circularity into Section 90.49 If a
46. Id. § 90 cmt. b.
47. See infra Part IV.B.
48. This reasoning is obviously circular, since it is precisely the efficacy of the
disclaimer that is in question.
49. The potential for circularity in Section 90 is often remarked upon. For
example, Barnett describes the problem as follows:
[W]hat many people would do in reliance on a promise is crucially affected
by their perception of whether or not the promise is enforceable....
A prediction that a promise can reasonably be expected to induce
reliance by a promisee or third party will unavoidably depend upon whether
the promisee or third party believes that reliance will be legally protected.
The legal rule itself cannot be formulated based on such a prediction,
however, without introducing a practical circularity into the analysis.
Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 275; see also Atiyah, Law of Obligations,
supra note 42, at 214 (explaining that it is "somewhat circular" to justify enforcement by
the promisee's reasonable expectation if the reasonableness of the expectation "turns
largely upon whether it is in fact protected"); Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra
note 11, at 446-47 ("The black letter of the doctrine is too circular to have descriptive or
predictive power: how can enforcement turn on the reasonableness of reliance when the
reasonableness of. reliance will necessarily depend on enforceability?"); Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at 1264 n. 15 ("[1]f moral force is attached to promises
merely because people rely upon them, the argument is subject to the claim that such
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non-bargain promise is made enforceable because the promisee's reliance
was foreseeable, and the promisee's reliance was foreseeable because she
foreseeably believed that the promise would be enforceable, then Section
90 seems to be either overbroad, unnecessary, or mischievous, depending
on the source of the promisee's belief. If the basis of her belief in
enforceability is the simple fact of her reliance on the promise's
performance, then Section 90 is overbroad in protecting all performance
reliance. If the basis of her belief in enforceability is something other
than her reliance, then it is either accurate (in which case Section 90 is
superfluous) or it is mistaken (in which case Section 90 would undermine
other rules of non-enforceability). In any event, Section 90 itself gives
no clue as to the (otherwise unenforceable) promises that a reasonable
promisee would believe to be enforceable.
Some commentators avoid this logical puddle by advocating
enforcement of all commercial promises that both parties recognize are
made to induce reliance, opting for overbreadth. This position is
tantamount to a rule of enforcement of all serious commercial promises
in which a disclaimer is not made. But while such a rule, once
announced, is consistent with the promisor-choice theory of contract
enforceability, it is no more so than its opposite: that Section 90 enforces
only those relied-upon commercial promises in which the promisor
expresses an intention to be legally bound. As Richard Craswell has
recognized in analyzing a similar issue, if we assume legal awareness by
both parties, either "default" rule would be equally consistent with the
promisor's autonomy and the promisee's ability to rely beneficially.51
Despite this symmetry, however, the preceding analysis of the
rationale for commercial promises implies that the second rule-no
enforcement without a specific statement of intent to be legally bound-is
more likely to coincide with the natural tendency of a commercial
promisor to reassure the promisee whenever the promise is intended to be
reliance is dependent upon legal enforceability."); Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?,
supra note 12, at 1254.
In contrast, Richard Craswell contends that if Section 90 is pegged to an objective
standard of reasonable reliance that has reference to the likelihood that beneficial reliance
would result from enforceability ex ante, then the problem of circularity can be avoided.
Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12; see also Jim Leitzel, Reliance and Contract
Breach, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 88 (1989). Craswell assumes, however, that
this calculation would be feasible only for purposes of developing the theory of efficient
reliance and acknowledges its difficulty of application in practice. Craswell, Efficient
Reliance, supra note 12, at 501.
50. E.g., Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27.
51. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 485-86; see also Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 489, 512-15 (1989) [hereinafter Craswell, Default Rules].
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legally enforceable. No commercial promisor would ever want to make
an enforceable Section 90 promise without such an express statement
because he would be incurring the potential cost of enforceability without
its beneficial effect on promisee reliance.
The proposed default rule is consistent with the text of Section 90.
If justice does not require the enforcement of a promise that the promisee,
because of a disclaimer, had reason to believe was legally unenforceable,
then justice should not require enforcement of a promise that the promisee
had no reason to believe was legally enforceable. In light of common
commercial practice, legally sophisticated commercial promisees have no
reason to believe that a non-bargain promise made by a commercial
promisor is legally enforceable in the absence of a manifested intention
that it be so. To grant ex post enforcement of such promises does not
serve to induce efficient reliance and increases transaction costs of
contracting.
Conversely, to enforce a non-bargain promise that is accompanied by
an expression of intent that it be legally binding would resolve the
circularity problem with a minimum of violence to logic and existing
contract doctrine. The promisee's belief in enforceability would be well-
grounded, not mistaken, in the new rule. Section 90 would be neither
overbroad, superfluous, nor mischievous.
C. Section 90 and Efficient Reliance
Economic analysis is quintessentially instrumentalist in its view that
law is primarily a means of directing or influencing behavior. 2 Indeed,
economic analysis of a contract rule such as Section 90 seeks to find its
sole justification in the economic effects of such behavioral adaptations ."
A rule that protects a person's reliance on the promises of another person
52. By "instrumentalist" I refer to the view that law is primarily concerned with
establishing incentives and disincentives in order to influence behavior. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 4 (1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 29 (1990) (identifying instrumentalist, means/ends jurisprudence with a
pragmatic approach to law); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW
AND THEORY 43-44 (2d ed. 1993); Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16,
at 1263-64.
Though it is probably the dominant strain in contemporary contracts jurisprudence,
instrumentalism has its critics. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (noting numerous descriptive and normative problems
with pragmatic instrumentalism); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1030 (1981) (criticizing the accepted view that all law is adaptive);
Karl E. Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
876, 881 n.20 (1979) (book review).
53. Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at 1263-64.
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will influence both the quantity and quality of such promises and the
amount of such reliance on them that will occur, so long as the parties are
assumed to be aware of the rule.' Thus far, economic analysis has
sought to demonstrate that Section 90 will encourage efficient levels of
reliance on non-bargain promises and that this reliance would not occur
in its absence.
An instrumentalist analysis of Section 90 must begin by
acknowledging that, like most common law, Section 90 was not the
product of self-conscious social engineering. The little story of how
Section 90 came to be has now achieved the status of an originary myth
among contracts scholars.55 The authors of the first Restatement did not
conceive their role as writing behavioral rules on a blank slate, but as
collecting and synthesizing the common law as they found it. The
Gilmore/Corbin story has it that Section 90 was written because the
bargain exchange theory of consideration failed to explain the outcomes
in many cases in which promisees had been given remedies for the breach
of gratuitous or otherwise unbargained-for promises." The Restaters
54. See id. at 1264.
55. Interested readers may consult the sacred text in GILMORE, DEATH OF
CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 62-64. In Gilmore's version, Williston and the other
Restaters were prepared to enthrone the bargain consideration doctrine expressed in
Section 75 (now Section 71) as the exclusive source of contractual enforceability when
they were challenged by Corbin, waiving a sheaf of "hundreds" of cases in which
common law courts had enforced non-bargain promises after the promisee had relied. The
need to accommodate this authority led to the supplementary and subversive reliance-based
doctrines of Sections 88-90. Id. Doubt was recently cast on Gilmore's account of
Williston's and Corbin's respective roles in this drama by evidence that Williston himself
drafted Section 90, as noted in a letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, the
original Reporter for the Second Restatement of Contracts. Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve
Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher Annotated, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
755, 769 n.40 (1993); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of
the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1455-61 (1987) (tracing the evolution of
Williston's and Corbin's beliefs about promissory estoppel from 1903 through 1930 by
reference to their contracts casebooks).
56. See supra note 55. It has been argued that the chronology implicit in this
account-that the classical consideration doctrine of the nineteenth century was followed
by gradual recognition of reliance as a basis of contract enforcement-ignores judicial
recognition of reliance as a basis of contract in earlier times. Compare ATIYAH, RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 27, at 739-79 and MORTON HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 161-93 (1977) and Feinman,
Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, supra note 2, at 679 with A.W.B. Simpson,
The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 561-67 (1979)
(arguing that Horwitz's thesis rests on a romanticized version of eighteenth century law
and a misinterpretation of the case law).
Whether reliance was in fact protected before nineteenth century classical contract
theory is irrelevant to my argument, however, which focuses on the decision of the
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synthesized the principles announced in these cases into the very abstract
generalization expressed in Section 90, apparently without considering its
intended effects on the reliance of legally aware, commercial promisees.
The Restaters did not discuss the adaptive, reliance effects of Section 90
in their analysis of promissory estoppel.57
Indeed, one can make a strong case that the Restaters did not
consider Section 90 to be a rule of behavioral adaptation at all. Instead
of a legal constraint that promisors and promisees would be expected to
take into account at the time of promising or relying, Williston seems to
have considered Section 90 to be a tool with which courts could achieve
ex post equitable results in cases in which the doctrine of bargain contract
would almost, but not quite, fit:
Unquestionably, the word "injustice" [in Section 90] . . .
leaves a certain leeway one way or the other to the judge. As
someone expressed it, in regard to [Section 90], if you bind up
too closely, with definite mathematical rules the law of
consideration, the boiler will burst. You have got to leave the
court a certain leeway outside of those mathematical and exact
rules. This section is, so to speak, the safety valve for the
subject of consideration. 8
If, as Williston said, Section 90 was intended to give courts leeway
outside the exact rules of consideration, it would be aimed at ex post
corrective justice considerations rather than ex ante behavioral
incentives. 59  Williston apparently did not view Section 90 as having
Restaters and others to give protection to unbargained-for reliance in the twentieth
century.
57. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2. More generally, the drafters of the First
Restatement intentionally refrained from presenting supporting policy arguments. Lon L.
Fuller, Introduction to 2 THE 20TH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS at xx (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (M. Magdalena Schoch
ed. & trans., 1948) ("The law [the Restatements] expound is not exactly a purposeless
law, but it is a law intentionally abstracted from its purposes in the process of exposition,
on the theory that this divorce is conducive to certainty in application."); Samuel
Williston, The Restatement of Contracts: Statement by Samuel Williston, 18 A.B.A. J.
775, 776-77 (1932) (explaining that the Restaters thought that it was better to present the
results of their research in a statutory form without supporting arguments). Both
authorities (Fuller and Williston) are cited in ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE
50-51 (3d ed. 1997).
58. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 86.
59. If so, Section 90 would be what Mier Dan-Cohen refers to as a decision rule
(directed at judges) rather than a conduct rule (directed at parties). See Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV.
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been designed or intended to have prospective effects on either promising
or relying. Indeed, it would be difficult for parties to predict such effects
if estoppel had to operate outside "exact rules."
Williston's conception of Section 90 obviously conflicts with the
instrumentalist premises of economic analysis of law. So long as rational,
self-interested parties are aware of the legal effects of promising and
relying, Section 90 cannot but have an effect on those behaviors, and it
is this reaction that economic analysis seeks to ascertain. The most recent
of these attempts is that of Richard Craswell,6' who argues that the
enforceability of pre-contractual promises is intended to induce the
promisee to choose an efficient level of reliance on the promise.6'
Section 90 operates efficiently when it shifts the cost of non-performance
to the promisor in precisely those cases in which the promisor can bear
that risk at less cost than the promisee.' Craswell argues that the courts
enforce those non-bargain, pre-contractual promises in which the
promisee's reliance is economically efficient.'
According to Craswell, when a promisor expresses an intention to be
or not to be legally bound by a non-bargain promise, efficiency dictates
that the courts respect and enforce that intention.' He thus adopts a
promisor-choice rule when such a choice is expressed. In cases in which
the promisor does not express such an intention, Craswell contends that
the court should effectuate the hypothetical bargain that the parties would
L. REV. 625 (1984). As with the rules of criminal law discussed by Dan-Cohen, Section
90 might become reflexive and counter-productive if explicitly relied upon by commercial
actors. I explore this possibility in Sidney W. DeLong, Reliance on Rules on Reliance
(in progress) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
60. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12. I will focus on Craswell's
analysis because he builds on the pioneering work of Goetz and Scott. See Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises, supra note 16. Avery Katz, however, has also conducted an
economic analysis of the role of estoppel in bid cases. See Katz, When Should an Offer
Stick?, supra note 12 (focusing on the relative bargaining power of offerors and offerees).
61. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 483-85 (citing Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises, supra note 16). Craswell explains that the efficiency of reliance on
a promise that precedes the formation of a contract depends on three factors:
(1) the extent to which [the promisee's] reliance would have increased the
value of the transaction, if the transaction had been consummated; (2) the
extent to which [the promisee's] reliance increased his, losses, if the
transaction was not consummated; and (3) the estimated probability, at the
time that [the promisee] had to rely, that the transaction would or would not
be unconsummated.
Id. at 501.
62. Id. at 485, 504-07, 535.
63. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12.
64. Id.
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have struck if they had thought about it at the time of the promise.' He
contends that this would have been that the promise would be always
enforceable whenever the promisee's reliance would be efficient, and
always unenforceable otherwise. Craswell prefers that courts engage in
a case-by-case analysis to determine which of the parties is the lowest-cost
risk bearer,' and his detailed analysis of case law leads him to believe
that this rule is generally, though not universally, followed:
On the question of how the court can determine the economic
efficiency of the promisee's reliance, Craswell argues that reliance on a
non-bargain, commercial promise is always efficient when it is expressly
encouraged or requested by a promisor (who is presumed to have superior
information about the efficiency of reliance).67 He contends that it is
such reliance that Section 90 ought to and does in fact protect. But as
argued in the preceding section, all commercial promises are made to
induce reliance. If promisors prefer to make unenforceable, reliance-
inducing promises, then courts should not alter their choice by making
such promises enforceable. The problem with Craswell's analysis is that
it fails to demonstrate that efficient levels of reliance will not be achieved
in such cases by performance-reliance alone, i.e., by reliance on a
promise that both parties realize is unenforceable. '
If, as Craswell maintains, promisors are in the best position to
determine the efficiency of enforcement reliance, then evidence of
promisor activity in general demonstrates that, with the exception of
formal options, 70 commercial promisors virtually7' never express an
65. Id. at 483-84, 486-87. Craswell's rule is a default rule because it can be
overcome by the promisor's expression of an intention to be bound or not bound. He
argues that the autonomy of the promisor does not assist in the selection of a default rule:
either a rule of liability or non-liability will foist on the promisor an equally voluntary or
involuntary legal relation. Id. at 485-86.
66. Id. at 544-53.
67. Id. at 504-07.
68. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 531-36.
69. This omission in the analysis is curious, because Craswell recognizes that
unenforceable promises might encourage efficient levels of reliance. Craswell, Default
Rules, supra note 51, at 500 n.30; Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 12, at 493.
70. Under the Restatement definition, an option contract is an irrevocable offer.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 25. Commercial offers are sometimes made
expressly irrevocable, which can be seen as an expression of an intention to be legally
bound. Subcontractors' bids are made irrevocable under the principle of promissory
estoppel when they induce the general contractor to use them in making a bid. Drennan
v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958). This rule seems well established
today. Architectural Metal Sys. v. Consolidated Sys., 58 F.3d 1227 (7th Cir. 1995);
Percy J. Matherne Contractor v. Grinnell Fire Protection Sys. Co., 915 F. Supp. 818
(M.D. La. 1995) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff general contractor), aff'd mem.,
102 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 1996); Pavel Enters. v. A.S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521 (Md.
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intention to be legally bound to a promise outside a bargain contract and
that when they have an opportunity to express an opinion about
enforceability, they usually disclaim liability. If empirical evidence of
promisor intention to be bound is superior to speculation about the
hypothetical bargains as a guide to the appropriate default rule, then that
evidence suggests a default rule of non-liability in the absence of a clear
expression of intention to be bound.
In sum, it would appear that Section 90 has not been shown to
reduce the costs of contracting by making reliance-inducing promises
enforceable even when that reliance is specifically sought by the
promisor. The efficiency of enforceability must be determined by the
promisor. It is reasonable to assume that any commercial promisor who
wants to make an enforceable promise will incur the cost of assuring the
promisee of its enforceability. No promisor will ever want to make a
promise that is enforceable under Section 90 without expressly assuring
the promisee that the promise is enforceable, so as to gain the benefit of
enforceability. Thus, contrary to Craswell, I contend that economic
policy favors a blanket rule of non-enforceability in the absence of an
expression to be legally bound.
III. THE NEW CONSENSUS AND THE DEATH OF RELIANCE
In a recent article, The Death of Reliance, Randy Barnett announced
that a "new consensus" of contracts scholars has recognized and endorsed
a shift in the judicial conception of promissory estoppel. 72 They have
concluded that, despite the language of Section 90, a promisee's actual
reliance is no longer necessary to the enforcement of a Section 90
promise. Barnett's announcement of the "death of reliance" alludes to
1996) (adopting the rule and discussing its history and theory); see also Strata Prod. Co.
v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1996) (holding unilateral contract offer
of working interest for drilled well irrevocable through promissory estoppel because of
offeree's foreseeable reliance in drilling related well).
The general contractor who seeks to "bid shop" after the award of the prime
contract may, however, lose the ability to hold the subcontractor to its bid on grounds of
non-reliance. E.g., Lahr Constr. Corp. v. J. Kozel & Son, 640 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1996) (refusing to hold contractor liable under a theory of promissory estoppel
because contractor did not demonstrate reliance on the implied promise in that it sought
to negotiate different terms with subcontractor after being awarded prime contract).
71. An expression of intention to be bound occurs occasionally in precontractual
agreements such as that discussed infra Part IV.D.
72. Barnett, Death of Reliance, supra note 11, at 522-27. Barnett identified
members of the new consensus as himself and Mary Becker, Daniel Farber and John
Matheson, Edward Yorio and Steve Thel, Juliet Kostrisky, and Jay Feinman. Id.
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Grant Gilmore's The Death of ContracP and its provocative thesis that
protection of the reliance interest through the use of the new doctrine of
promissory estoppel would signal the end of bargain contract and the
consideration doctrine.74 Gilmore predicted that giving promisees a
generalized tort-like remedy would cause contract law to be "reabsorbed"
by tort law, from which it had so recently emerged.75
The new consensus rejects Gilmore's thesis that Section 90 is a tort-
like doctrine intended to compensate disappointed promisees for the costs
of reliance on unfulfilled, non-bargain promises.76 Instead, it rests on
the idea that Section 90 is a contract doctrine and that its rationale lies in
the enforcement of promises.77 The two most prominent of these
theories can be said to locate the critical source of Section 90 obligation
in promise and in consent.78
73. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 1.
74. Id. at 87-91. Gilmore suggested the possibility that this might occur,
attributing the declaration of the death of contract to unnamed others. Id. at 3; see also
Commonwealth v. Scituate Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884) (Holmes, J.) ("It
would cut up the doctrine of consideration by the roots, if a promisee could make a
gratuitous promise binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it."); Note, Contracts-
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 3, at 218 ("The fear that general adoption of the doctrine
[of promissory estoppel] would tend to abolish consideration in contract cases is almost
universal."). Both of the latter authorities are cited in ROBERT A. HILLMAN & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND
PRACTICE 82 (2d ed. 1992).
75. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 87-91. See generally
Symposium, Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
1 (1995). Gilmore's view that promissory estoppel sounded in tort rather than in contract
remedy was widely held. See supra note 17. Barnett criticized Gilmore's "reabsorption"
thesis on the ground that neither "contract" nor "tort" was a meaningful category at the
time of the rise of the bargain theory of consideration, when the forms of action defined
the types of civil obligation. Barnett, Death of Reliance, supra note 11, at 520. Gilmore,
however, seems to have acknowledged this point. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT,
supra note 1, at 140 n.228. But see W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract
Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197 (1990) [hereinafter Slawson, Role of Reliance]
(criticizing both Gilmore and Barnett as incorrectly labeling reliance-based liability as
sounding in tort rather than contract).
76. See supra note 17. The "tort or contract" quality of promissory estoppel is
relevant to several legal issues. For example, it may determine whether a state may be
sued for promissory estoppel in the face of a statute granting it immunity from tort claims.
See, e.g., Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254, 259 (Colo. 1996) (holding that
whether a claim for promissory estoppel is a tort or contract claim for purposes of the
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
77. Yorio and Thel trace the contract approach to Samuel Williston, the Chief
Reporter for the First Restatement. Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90,
supra note 11.
78. Barnett, Death of Reliance, supra note 11, at 522-27. Barnett identified as
members of the new consensus two additional theorists whose views will not be analyzed
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A. Promise Theories
The promise theorists build on earlier views that Section 90 is a pure
contract doctrine. 9 In his 1981 book, Contract as Promise, Charles
in this Article:
(1) Juliet P. Kostritsky. See Kostritsky, A New Theory, supra note 11. Professor
Kostritsky argues that Section 90 promises should be enforceable in situations in which
the parties face barriers to negotiation of formal, bargain promises. Id. at 905. These
barriers may arise in the presence of any of three factors: the parties are "enmeshed" in
a broader relationship; the parties possess different degrees of status, power or knowledge;
or the parties have a relationship of trust or confidence. Id. at 906-07, 911-29. She
argues that a court should enforce any promise made in such a context that is likely to
induce reliance by the promisee that would confer a benefit on the promisor. Id. at 946-
47. For Kostritsky, the presence of a benefit also manifests "assent" to be bound that
substitutes for the usual requirements of formal contract. Id. at 947. Kostritsky's position
overlaps with Barnett's in this respect, but she does not contend that manifestation of an
intention to be bound alone would support enforcement under Section 90, as does Barnett.
It may be that under Kostritsky's scheme, a court would not enforce a Section 90
promise if a bargain contract were feasible, but that is unclear. Her assertion that
"barriers" to formal contract exist in, for example, long-term commercial relations among
unequal parties is unconvincing, given the large number of formal employment
agreements, distributorship agreements, loan agreements, and the like that do exist
between such parties.
(2) Jay M. Feinman. See Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (1992); Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A
Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373; Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and
Judicial Method, supra note 2. Jay Feinman is the chief exponent of the relational
contract theories of Section 90. Although Feinman has renounced both bargain-promise
and Section 90 in favor of a totally relational approach to contract enforcement that is
freed of such constrictive concepts as "promise" or "bargain," he suggests that the law
should enforce promises that tend to arise out of and foster long-term relations of trust and
confidence, and in which formal discrete exchange contracts would not be appropriate.
It is unclear from his description whether actual reliance would be essential or even
relevant to such enforcement, in part because it is unclear exactly what role legal
enforceability should play in commercial relationships under a relational theory.
79. Precursors of the promise theory arguably include both Corbin and Williston.
Corbin considered reliance to have been a historic form of consideration that pre-dated
bargain theory. See supra note 1. In the debates over the First Restatement's version of
Section 90, Williston contended that Section 90 was, by definition, contractual because
it enforced a promise. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 94 (remark of Mr. Williston) ("A
contract to my mind is a binding promise, and in the case we are referring to [Johnny and
the car], under the stated circumstances, the promise itself is binding."); id. at 95, 102,
111-12. On this basis, he reasoned that the remedy for breach should be full expectation
damages rather than compensation for reliance losses. Id. at 103-04.
Even as he defended the contractual character of Section 90, however, Williston
agreed that a Section 90 promise would not become binding until the promisee had
actually relied on it. Id. at 88. It is also pertinent that Williston named the new doctrine
"promissory estoppel" after the tort doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at 97; Henderson,
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 1, at 376 n. 182. "Estoppel" suggests that Section 90's
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Fried argued that Section 90 promises were enforced because of the
promisor's moral obligation to perform promises rather than because of
promisee reliance.' Fried rejected the idea that promises are
enforceable in order to protect the reliance interest: "[R]eliance on a
promise cannot alone explain its force: There is reliance because a
promise is binding, and not the other way around."81 Fried dismissed
Section 90 as "a belated attempt to plug a gap in the general regime of
enforcement of promises, a gap left by the artificial and unfortunate
doctrine of consideration."'
The first two members of the "new consensus" among Section 90
promise theorists were Daniel Farber and John Matheson. 3 Their 1985
article, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible
Handshake"8' was based on their analysis of cases dealing with
promissory estoppel decided during the preceding decade. They
concluded that, despite the text of Section 90, courts actually enforce
serious promises made in the course of commercial activity without
requiring proof of actual reliance.' They also found that the usual
remedy for breach of a Section 90 promise is expectation damages rather
than reliance damages.86
purpose was the prevention of injustice rather than the creation of a system of intentional
contract formation.
In their influential article on the reliance interest in contract damages, Fuller and
Perdue speculated that the award of damages measured by the promisee's expectation in
cases of promissory estoppel might evidence a "mixed motive" animating the doctrine.
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest, supra note 23, at 68-70. While reliance was
necessary to a finding of liability, the resulting power of enforcement unlocked a latent
societal impulse to hold promisors to their bargains, which led to the award of expectation
damages. Id.
Williston's "enforcement of promises" rationale was drawn into question by the
amendments to Section 90 in the Second Restatement, which was published in 1981. The
new version deleted Williston's requirement that the foreseeable reliance be "definite and
substantial," FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90, and added a sentence providing
that the "remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires," SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90. This addition was widely interpreted to encourage
courts to award reliance damages rather than expectation damages. See id. § 90 cmt. d;
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 2.19; Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis
of Section 90, supra note 11, at 137 n.170.
80. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 19 (1981), cited in Yorio &
Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 121.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 25 (unnumbered footnote "*").
83. See Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 910-14.
86. Id. at 909.
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The most recent of the promise theorists are Edward Yorio and Steve
Thel. In their 1991 article The Promissory Basis of Section 90,8' they
analyzed the precedent cited by the Restatements and others as authority
for Section 90 and concluded that promissory estoppel has always been
based on promise rather than reliance." Their analysis of this precedent
concluded that expectation damages are routinely awarded under Section
90,9 with reliance damages being awarded only in anomalous cases;'
that actual reliance is neither necessary nor sufficient for liability;91 and
that only promises that are seriously made are enforced.'
1. DESCRIPTIVE CRITIQUE OF PROMISE THEORY
How closely does Farber and Matheson's description of what courts
were doing in 1985 coincide with the current state of the law? To answer
this question, I reviewed a sample of recent case law involving the
87. Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11.
88. As Farber and Matheson explain:
Like the rest of contract law, Section 90 is about promises. What
distinguishes enforceable promises from unenforceable ones under Section 90
are the proof and quality of the promisor's commitment. Whenever the
criteria for a serious commitment by the promisor are satisfied, the promisee
obtains full expectancy relief (if feasible) for the breach. Issues of both
liability and remedy under Section 90 turn on promise, not reliance.
Id. at 167.
89. Id. at 129-51. The authors conclude that in cases in which a reliance measure
of damages is used, expectancy damages cannot be calculated. Id. at 136.
90. Id. at 137-51.
91. Id. at 151-60. The authors explain:
A promissory view of Section 90 ... requires neither actual inducement
nor detriment to enforce a promise. So long as the possibility of definite and
substantial action (or forbearance) by the promisee was conveyed to the
promisor, the promise is likely to have been sufficiently well considered to
justify enforcement. Although actual inducement and detriment may
strengthen the case for legal intervention, a court proceeding from a
promissory perspective might enforce the promise in the absence of both.
Id. at 152.
The authors advance the curious argument that reliance cannot be the rationale for
Section 90 because there are cases of reliance and no liability. Id. at 160. Under the
language of Section 90, reliance is a necessary but not sufficient condition to recovery.
Only an assumption that only one "principle" can underlie the operation of the statute
could make one think that such cases are relevant. See Pham, Waning, supra note 2, at
1270.
92. Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 162-63
("What distinguishes enforceable from unenforceable promises is the quality of the
commitment made by the promisor .... The promisor's contemplation of particular and
substantial reliance is important not in and of itself, but because it signals the quality of
her commitment.").
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doctrine of promissory estoppel. The days are long past when one can
lightly undertake to read the entire corpus of promissory estoppel cases,
or even those of a decade, as did Farber and Matheson.9' But the case
law explosion does make it possible to get a healthy sample from a two
year period. Approximately 966 cases that used the term "promissory
estoppel" were reported in LEXIS for the years 1995 and 1996 (compared
to 540 in the 10 year period studied by Farber and Matheson).' About
800 of these cases involved claims of promissory estoppel, of which about
half had some substantive discussion of the doctrine.95
In 1985, Farber and Matheson premised their normative argument on
four empirical findings:
1. "[P]romissory estoppel is regularly applied to the
gamut of commercial contexts."'
2. "[P]romissory estoppel is . . . . a primary basis of
enforcement," often applied when there is no barrier
to recovery on a breach of contract theory. 97
3. "[R]eliance plays little role in the determination of
remedies," with courts typically awarding expectation
damages or equitable relief such as specific
performance or injunction.9"
4. The "most important finding is the diminished role of
reliance in determining liability"; detriment is no
longer required for enforceability.'
93. Farber and Matheson based their findings on approximately 222 cases,
representing all those cases within a 10-year period that had applied Section 90. Farber
& Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 907 n. 14. During that decade, the
term "promissory estoppel" appeared in 540 cases. 1d. A crude measure of the growing
size of the body of case law can be obtained from the computerized legal databases,
LEXIS and Westlaw. As of April 5, 1997, the total number of state and federal opinions
in those databases in which the term "promissory estoppel" appeared was 5,861 (LEXIS)
or 5,908 (Westlaw). The total number from January 1, 1985 to that date was 4,544
(LEXIS) or 4,503 (Westlaw).
94. See supra note 93.
95. This estimate involves a necessarily subjective assessment of the degree to
which the case on appeal raised issues relating to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. I
do not offer this survey as any sort of statistical sample.
96. Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 907.
97. Id. at 908.
98. Id. at 909-10.
99. Id. at 910.
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These conclusions will be reconsidered in light of the 1995-1996
sample:
1. "[Plromissory estoppel is regularly applied to the gamut of
commercial contexts."
If "applied" means "alleged," then this observation has become even
more true than when it was made in 1985, to the point at which virtually
all the reported cases dealing with Section 90 are commercial cases.
Intrafamilial promises and charitable donation cases appear to be growing
almost as rare as promises in consideration of marriage. In fact, out of
about 966 reported cases in the 1995-1996 period, only one was found to
involve a "classic" intrafamilial gift promise.10°  Once a staple of
nineteenth-century contracts litigation, and the chief source of
hypotheticals considered by the drafters of the First Restatement,"°1 such
cases even now make up a disproportionate percentage of the cases in the
typical Contracts casebook. 12 As Stanley Henderson observed in 1969,
the virtual extinction of such cases from the appellate landscape implies
100. Shumate v. Dugan, 934 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (unsuccessfulclaim
of promissory estoppel to enforce oral promise to convey land); see also Weinig v.
Weinig, 674 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to enforce under Section 90 a
wife's promise not to claim proceeds of winning lottery ticket after divorce, because it did
not induce husband to rely). Others have noted the disappearance of family gift cases.
E.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 261-62 (abr. ed.
Michie Co. 1995) [hereinafter MACAULAY ET AL., LAW IN ACTION]. It is interesting to
speculate on the causes of the disappearance of conditional gift cases from the litigation
landscape of the 90s. Possibilities include the decreasing importance of intergenerational
wealth transfers, especially of land, in relation to the wealth generated as income, see
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CASE STUDY 36-39 (1965), the increased expense of litigation in relation to the value of
family gifts, and the impoverishment caused by medical expenses and care for the aged
property owner.
Promissory estoppel has begun to appear in claims for child support. E.g., Wright
v. Newman, 467 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. 1996) (husband who had previously acknowledged
paternity in various ways was barred by promissory estoppel from denying paternity in
support action); Guise v. Robinson, 555 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (same).
101. See supra note 2.
102. Most casebooks include several of the following intrafamilial gift or gift-
contract cases: Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845); Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 A.
106 (Me. 1917); Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77
N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882); Dougherty v. Salt, 125
N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919); De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917); Hamer v.
Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
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that policy arguments based on informal, intrafamilial promises are based
on a misleading conception of the role of Section 90.103
If, however, as is more likely, Farber and Matheson meant that
promissory estoppel is "regularly used by courts to impose an obligation"
then they were seriously mistaken. It would be no great exaggeration to
say that promissory estoppel has had no significant impact on commercial
transactions. Though there has been a steep increase in the absolute
number of cases involving Section 90 claims, both the number and the
percentage that are successful through appeal is exceedingly small. Only
a handful of the cases reported in 1995-96 displayed a final judgment
favoring the plaintiff in a promissory estoppel claim." 4  The facts in
103. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel, supra note 1, at 352 ("[If the gratuitous
promise is no longer relevant to the theory of Section 90, policy considerations developed
in relation to the conventional idea of promissory estoppel will have to be carefully
examined before Section 90 is made a vehicle for relieving injustices occasioned by
business bargains.").
104. See Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., 47 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995)
(remanding for recalculation of damages); Robeson v. Midwest Ford, Inc., No. 94-3405,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24641 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 1995); Percy J. Matherne Contractor
v. Grinnell Fire Protection Sys. Co., 915 F. Supp. 818 (M.D. La. 1995); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Krauth v.
Executive Telecard, Ltd., 890 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Meaney v. Connecticut
Hosp. Ass'n, No. 35 52 65, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1440 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 31,
1996); Rooney v. Paul D. Osborne Desk Co., 645 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995);
Royal Fixture Co. v. Phoenix Leasing, 891 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Howard
v. Kluehnert, No. 95APE09-1197, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1323 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28,
1996); Lancaster Brokers v. Kull, No. 94 CA 59, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3568 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 27, 1995); Villagran v. Central Ohio Bus. Servs., No. 94APE08-1267, 1995
Ohio App. LEXIS 2366 (Ohio Ct. App. June 8, 1995); Central Texas Micrographics v.
Leal, 908 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Clement v. Woodstock Resort Corp., 687
A.2d 886 (Vt. 1996).
See also Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo's, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff enforcing oral contract modification on
promissory estoppel as alternative ground); Wright v. Newman, 467 S.E.2d 533 (Ga.
1996) (estopping a denial of paternity); Guise v. Robinson, 555 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1996) (same); Axelson v. Minneapolis Teachers' Retirement Fund Ass'n, 532
N.W.2d 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (estopping retirement fund from refusing to permit
employee to purchase service credits that it had promised him he could purchase); Pilot
Oil Corp. v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 656 N.E.2d 1379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding
state estopped by its prior approval of a sign); Jones v. Best, No. 14634-1-rI, 1996
Wash. App. LEXIS 704 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (holding broker who offered to
take reduced fee estopped under Section 90 from claiming full fee).
This is consistent with the assessments reported by other commentators. See supra
note 18. While it is possible that plaintiffs succeed in promissory estoppel claims that did
not result in reported opinions, it is unlikely that there are many unreported decisions for
plaintiff because it is reasonable to assume that defendants would appeal a comparable
number of plaintiffs' judgments if cases were being decided in plaintiffs' favor at the trial
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almost all of those cases would probably have supported a breach of
contract claim as well." This accords with other studies of the success
rates of promissory estoppel claims going back to 1981."
2. "[Pjromissory estoppel is . . . . a primary basis of
enforcement, "often applied when there is no barrier to recovery
on a breach of contract theory.
This observation is no longer valid. In most jurisdictions,
promissory estoppel is subordinate to the doctrine of bargain contract.', 7
Many jurisdictions have developed a rule under which the existence of a
bargain contract concerning a subject automatically bars any claim of
promissory estoppel relating to the same subject." s  Even in
court level.
105. Robeson v. Midwest Ford, Inc., No. 94-3405, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24641
(6th Cir. Aug. 17, 1995) (employer's express promise of permanent employment would
apparently justify an express contract); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 897 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (defendant's purchase order would apparently
justify a claim of breach of contract to purchase stocks); Krauth v. Executive Telecard,
Ltd., 890 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff on both
express contract and promissory estoppel grounds in action to enforce written settlement
agreement); Rooney v. Paul D. Osborne Desk Co., 645 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)
(claim of employee compensation based on corporate resolution apparently justified
express contract remedy); Royal Fixture Co. v. Phoenix Leasing, 891 S.W.2d 553, 555
n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (enforcing promise to pay for equipment furnished to third party
lessee, and electing not to review alternative claim of breach of contract because
promissory estoppel supports the judgment); Lancaster Brokers v. Kull, No. 1994 CA 59,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3568 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1995) (affirming a general jury
verdict in which promissory estoppel was one of four contract-related claims); Villagran
v. Central Ohio Bus. Servs., No. 94APE08-1267, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2366 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 8, 1995) (affirming judgment on grounds of promissory estoppel as well as
express and implied contract); Central Texas Micrographics v. Leal, 908 S.W.2d 292
(Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that promissory estoppel was alternative ground to express
contract in affirming judgment in employee's claim for compensation for services
rendered); Clement v. Woodstock Resort Corp., 687 A.2d 886 (Vt. 1996) (affirming
general verdict for plaintiff making claims of promissory estoppel and breach of contract);
Jones v. Best, No. 14634-1-1n, 1996 Wash. App. LEXIS 704 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 3,
1996) (holding broker estopped from claiming full commission when broker agreed to
accept less to induce seller to sell). This too is consistent with other surveys of
promissory estoppel cases. See Pham, Waning, supra note 2, at 1273-76.
106. See supra note 21.
107. Pham, Waning, supra note 2.
108. Terry Barr Sales Agency v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174 (6th Cir. 1996);
Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1996) (New Mexico law); Gadsby v.
Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995); Advanced Plastics Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., No. 93-2155, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1047 (6th Cir. Jan. 18,
1995) (affirming summary judgment against terminated supplier, and holding promissory
Section 90 as Catch-22
jurisdictions in which a Section 90 claim is not barred by such a rule,
promissory estoppel is almost always displaced by inconsistent bargain
contract behavior. Thus, for example, a formal written contract cannot
usually be overcome by a subsequent, reliance-inducing promise, 9
estoppel claim not maintainable because both parties admit the existence of an express
contract); Bellairs v. Coors Brewing Co., 907 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1995) (Colorado
law); Jacobs v. Central Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (written lease
bars tenant's promissory estoppel claim); Iversen Baking Co. v. Weston Foods, 874 F.
Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Pennsylvania law); Avedas, Inc. v. Intouch Group, No. 94 C
6923, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5135 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 1995) (holding that plaintiff can
plead Section 90 in the alternative to express contract, but can recover under Section 90
only if the court finds no express contract); Don Lark v. Post Newsweek Stations Conn.,
No. CV94 070 53 26, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2332 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 1995)
(written employment agreement bars Section 90 claim); Franklin Outdoor Adver. Co. v.
Hovanetz, No. C8-95-736, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1485 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5,
1995); Jackson v. State Farm Ins. Cos., No. C2-95-764, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1301
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1995) (written employment agreement); Kaiser v. U.S.
Transformer, No. C8-95-252, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1203 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19,
1995) (no estoppel claim where jury found unilateral contract formed); Bichsel v.
Minnesota, No. C1-95-240, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 955, at *18 (Minn. Ct. App. July
25, 1995) (Section 90 is "wholly inapplicable" if there is an actual contract); Banbury v.
Omnitrition Int'l, 533 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (no Section 90 claim for
wrongful termination of a distributorship agreement if the written contract is terminable
at will); cf. Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511 (10th Cir. 1995) (under
Colorado law, an at-will employee may prove that promises made in an employee
handbook became binding on the employer either as unilateral contracts or under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel); Royal Fixture Co. v. Phoenix Leasing, 891 S.W.2d 553
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming judgment enforcing under Section 90 a promise to pay
for equipment furnished to a lessee, and stating there is no need to review the claim for
breach of contract); Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 679 A.2d 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(holding that alleged reliance on promise of at-will employment by terminating business
and preparing to move to employer's location precludes summary judgment for employer);
Housing Vt. v. Goldsmith & Morris, 685 A.2d 1086 (Vt. 1996). But see Architectural
Metal Sys. v. Consolidated Sys., 58 F.3d 1227 (7th Cir. 1995) (permitting alternative
claims of contract by offer and acceptance and under Section 90 contract, based on a
general contractor's use of a subcontractor's bid, but not discussing displacement of the
latter theory); Percy J. Matherne Contractor v. Grinnell Fire Protection Sys. Co., 915 F.
Supp. 818, 821 (M.D. La. 1995) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff on promissory
estoppel claim and finding it unnecessary to consider whether plaintiff also had a claim
for breach of contract).
Under Texas law, promissory estoppel cannot create affirmative contract rights in
the absence of contract, but can bar a party from pleading that an existing contract is
invalid or unenforceable. Oliver Resources PLC v. International Fin. Corp., 62 F.3d
128, 131 (5th Cir. 1995); Bravo v. Evans, No. 01-94-00696-CV, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS
999 (Tex. Ct. App. May 11, 1995) (holding that plaintiff can enforce Section 90 promise
where written earnest money contract was unenforceable).
109. Adiel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 95 Civ. 0725 (WK), 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13141 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1995) (holding that express contract clause permitting
termination of distributor precludes reasonable reliance on oral promise of non-
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whereas a subsequent, formal contract term will usually overcome a prior,
reliance-inducing promise.110
termination). The following cases dismissed Section 90 claims as being inconsistent with
disclaimers found in employment agreements or employee handbooks, even where the
promise came after the disclaimer: Vana v. Mallinckrodt Med., Inc., No. 94-3424, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 35488 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1995) (enforcing handbook disclaimer);
Backlund v. Gates Corp., 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,972 (10th Cir. 1995) (employee
signed disclaimer); Anderson v. Premier Indus. Corp., No. 94-3454, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23153 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 1995) (enforcing handbook disclaimer); In re Unisys
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
oral promise could not modify written benefit plan); Hatfield v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 52 F.3d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 1995) ("'[A] conspicuous and unambiguous
disclaimer [that employment is at-will] make[s] any reliance on the subsequent statements
of the employer unreasonable.'") (quoting Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701,
703 (Wyo. 1994)) (last alteration in original); Lawson v. Science Applications Int'l Corp.,
894 F. Supp. 378 (D. Colo. 1995) (signed disclaimer); Duncan v. St. Joseph's Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 903 P.2d 1107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Garmarker v. Sterling Elec. Constr.
Co., No. C4-95-1205, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1304 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1995)
(employee manual disclaimer, no collateral promise shown); Clark v. Washington Univ.,
906 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that letter appointing teacher to position,
unlike letters in earlier years, did not expressly appoint for a one year period, and thus
changed employment to at-will); McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 626
A.2d 425 (N.J. 1993) (declining to enforce oral promise to rehire after maternity leave
because of previously delivered employee manual making employment at-will); Chasko
v. Ellwood Eng'red Castings Co., 675 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Silcott v. Rio
Linda Chem. Co., No. 95APEll-1512, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2312 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 4, 1996); Latimore-DeBosev. BVM, Inc., No. 69439, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1425
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1996); Day v. Stanley Elec. U.S. Co., No. CA95-08-029, 1996
Ohio App. LEXIS 76 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1996); Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927
P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1996) (holding an oral promise not to terminate employee for cooperating
in internal investigation unenforceable because employee had signed disclaimer providing
that her employment was at-will and that no other employee had authority to alter it).
But see Orback v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 58,101 (D. Colo.
1995) (disclaimer in manual can be overcome only if employer otherwise expresses
intention to be bound to permanent employment, judged from employee's perspective);
Danko v. MBIS Inc., No. 68131, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4330 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28,
1995) (representations made after employee receives handbook containing disclaimer could
create liability under Section 90 if employer assurances negate disclaimer).
110. Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods., 64 F.3d 1202 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that
subsequent written franchise agreement supersedes prior oral promise not to terminate;
promisor could not foresee reliance after the written contract); Coil v. PB Diagnostic
Sys., 50 F.3d 1115 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that an oral promise superseded by a
subsequent written employment agreement could not be reasonably relied upon); Barnes
v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that subsequent
written franchise agreement giving franchisor discretion in opening new stores made
reliance on prior oral and written assurances of non-encroachment unreasonable as a
matter of law); Duncan v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 903 P.2d 1107 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that an "at-will" disclaimer contained in an employer's handbook
supersedes any implied contract resulting from the employee's prior fourteen year history
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Even non-contractual communications that envision a future bargain
contract will prevent the formation of a Section 90 contract. For
example, a prior manifested refusal to be bound to an express, bargain
contract can often preclude creation of a subsequent Section 90
contract."' Similarly, a written offer for a bargain contract that
contains a statement that it will not be binding until signed by both parties
will prevent the subsequent formation of an oral Section 90 contract
concerning the same subject matter. "2 Although such an offer is not
a contract, only a statement of intention, it has sufficient authority to bind
of employment with the same employer); Clark v. Washington Univ., 906 S.W.2d 789
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that letter appointing plaintiff to position, unlike letters in
preceding years, did not expressly appoint plaintiff for one year, and so created at-will
agreement); Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 662 N.E.2d 1074, 1080 (Ohio 1996) (barring
lender liability promissory estoppel claim under parol evidence rule, where loan
agreement was subsequently integrated); McCullough v. Avon Lake McDonald's, No.
95CA006066, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3529 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1995); Rasberry
v. Mansfield-Richland, Morrow Policy Comm., No. 94 CA 61, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
3647 (Ohio Ct. App. May 9, 1995) (oral promise superseded by subsequent written
employment agreement).
Contra Brusilovsky v. Figgie Int'l, No. 94 C 1506, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7341
(N.D. Ill. May 25, 1995) (holding that employee lured away from former job by oral
promise of non-terminable employment acquired rights upon reliance which were not lost
when employee entered written at-will employment agreement).
111. Kimzay Ill., Inc. v. Blockbuster Music Retail, No. 94-1528, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19680 (C.D. I11. June 2, 1995) (finding reliance on oral promise unreasonable as
a matter of law where proposed written contract said that it was not effective until
signed); James Eckmann Assocs. v. ABC Int'l Traders, No. 95 C 650, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7281 (N.D. 11. May 24, 1995) (rejecting claim of plaintiff who failed to
demonstrate a reasonable belief in defendant's oral representations that contract had been
accepted where written agreement required signature as prerequisite to acceptance); see
also Purnell, Inc. v. Thyssen, No. 01-95-00125-CV, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 1483 (Tex.
Ct. App. July 6, 1995) (concluding that plaintiff seeking injunction had no probable right
to recover on oral promise of confidentiality of trade secret where promisor had refused
to sign written confidentiality contract). But cf. Michael K. Sutley, P.A. v. Selchow, No.
C9-95-860, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 1996) (holding that
plaintiff reasonably relied on defendant's promise to reduce oral agreement to writing and
to sign it; defendant estopped from pleading statute of frauds).
112. Triax Pacific, Inc. v. American Ins. Co., No. 94-4091, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31097 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995) (stating that a promise cannot create liability
under Section 90 if it is made in the course of negotiating a written contract); HMS
Property Mgmt. Group v. Miller, Nos. 94-3668 to -3669, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35116
(6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1995) (holding that where parties contemplate that a contract
modification must be approved in a signed writing, reliance on oral modification is
unjustifiable); Puri v. Blockbuster Music Retail, No. 95-C-50018, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18819 (N.D. I11. Dec. 20, 1995) (discussed infra Part IV.B); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
v. Taco-Tico Acquisition Corp., 454 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that
reliance on oral promises was unreasonable as a matter of law in face of language in letter
of intent making it non-binding).
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
both of the parties so as to prevent a subsequent, superseding oral
promise under Section 90.
The few cases that permit recovery under Section 90 also often
emphasize its subordinate role. Thus, in Neiss v. Ehlers,113 the court
affirmed a judgment for plaintiff under Section 90, in the course of which
it characterized promissory estoppel as operating only in the interstices of
contract law:
It would be a nonsequitur to read the cases that require
promissory estoppel to be asserted in the context of a breach of
contract claim as meaning that promissory estoppel cannot be a
basis for relief within the claim, independently of any other
contract remedies; promissory estoppel can only become
necessary as a remedy for an unperformed promise if no
traditional contractual remedy is available for the
nonperformance. I 4
Most promissory estoppel claims are closely associated with, and are
joined with, counts alleging breach of express or implied contract. Over
half of the cases examined involved the termination of an at-will
relationship (such as employment or franchise). More than half of the
rest involved the failure to complete a negotiated deal (such an
acquisition, loan, or franchise). The claim of promissory estoppel was in
almost all these cases joined with a claim of breach of contract or, in the
employment context, a claim of statutory violation. The breach of
contract claim was typically vulnerable either to a Statute of Frauds
defense or to a defense based on disclaimers contained in documents
binding the parties. The number of "pure" promissory estoppel claims
was thus exceedingly rare. And as noted above, in the vast majority of
the promissory estoppel claims that were joined with other claims, if the
facts had warranted recovery on the promissory estoppel claim, they
would also have established the contract claim." 5 Promissory estoppel
thus does not provide a significant additional source of promissory
liability.
The subordination of Section 90 to formal contract in the business
world, while inconsistent with promise theory, is consistent with a central
113. 899 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
114. Id. at 706.
115. See supra note 105. In the employment termination context, for example, the
existence of a sufficiently clear promise of continued employment followed by the
employee's performance would give rise to a claim of contract implied in fact or of
unilateral contract. For a rare example of a successful claim, see Brown v. General Tire,
No. 17161, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 767 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1996).
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thesis of this article: legally aware, commercial actors prefer formal
contract as the exclusive mode of creating enforceable obligations. The
subordination of promissory estoppel to formal, bargain contract reflects
the preference of commercial promisors and promisees for certainty and
flexibility." 6
3. "[Rjeliance plays little role in the determination of remedies,"
with courts typically awarding expectation damages or equitable
relief such as specific performance or injunction.
While much of the evidence is equivocal, contemporary case law
moderately supports this conclusion. Although plaintiffs rarely succeed,
when they do they can recover expectation damages." 7 As Farber and
Matheson acknowledged, however, in commercial cases the reliance and
expectation interests often converge: "8 a court that appears to be
awarding expectation damages may be intending to award reliance
damages and vice versa."9 In the most common form of promissory
estoppel cases, which involve wrongful termination of at-will contractual
116. Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16 (explaining that
commercial actors prefer to incur the risk of non-performance until the deal is sufficiently
clear to shift that risk to the promisor via formal contract).
117. E.g., United Artists Theatre Circuit v. Monarch, Inc., Nos. 94-2155, 95-
6894, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18180 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1996); Upsher-Smith Lab. v.
Mylan Lab., Civ. No. 3-94-1148, 1996 US. Dist. LEXIS 16715 (D. Minn. Feb 28,
1996) (court had discretion to award consequential damages and lost profits); Lancaster
Brokers v. Kull, No. 1994 CA 59, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3568 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27,
1995) (recovery of real estate brokerage fee). The ability to obtain specific performance
is less well-settled. Compare Giordano v. Markovitz, 531 N.W.2d 815 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995) (indicating in dictum that specific performance is available when necessary to avoid
injustice), with Broward County v. Conner, 660 So.2d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(implying that specific performance of promise enforceable under Section 90 is not
available).
118. Farber and Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 909 n.24; see
also Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 147-48, 150.
In competitive markets, by relying on the promisor, the promisee may lose the opportunity
to obtain an equivalent contract performance from another promisor. Fuller & Perdue,
The Reliance Interest, supra note 23, at 60-62, 71-75. "[]n a hypothetical society in
which all values were available on the market and where all markets were 'perfect' in the
economic sense .... there would be no difference between the reliance interest and the
expectation interest." Id. at 62.
119. Percy J. Matherne Contractor v. Grinnell Fire Protection Sys. Co., 915 F.
Supp. 818, 824 (M.D. La. 1995) (reliance interest equivalent to expectation interest in
action by general contractor seeking to enforce bid under doctrine of promissory
estoppel).
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relationships, reliance damages are awarded because expectation damages
would be speculative." 2°
It is also notable that some courts justify findings of liability under
Section 90 by their ability to limit recovery to reliance. 12  For
example, in Neiss v. Ehlers'22 the court held that a plaintiff who had
entered an unenforceable "agreement to agree" to a stock purchase could
recover reliance damages incurred when she joined the defendants'
business in reliance on the proposed deal." The court affirmed that
an award under Section 90 is intended to compensate for loss rather than
to provide expectation damages and that the flexible remedial provisions
of Section 90 permitted recovery even when promises were too indefinite
to create a contract.'24
120. Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11; see also Yorio &
Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 147-48. The cases in the
sample permitted recovery of reliance damages in such situations, emphasizing the
flexibility of the Section 90 remedy. E.g., Oscar Prods. v. Zacharius, 893 F. Supp. 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying summary judgment for defendant, opining that plaintiff could
recover expenses incurred in writing a novel under oral promise of indefinite duration);
Pavliscak v. Bridgeport Hosp., No. CV91 20 01 74 S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1945
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1996) (awarding reliance damages in lieu of jury's award of
expectation damages for breach of promise of employment contract of indefinite duration);
Haas Carriage v. Berna, 651 N.E.2d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (limiting damages to
reliance losses for breach of promise of indefinite tenure); Gorham v. Benson Optical, 539
N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for defendant and
limiting at-will employee to reliance losses in claim for breach of oral contract); Blatnicky
v. Sheller-Globe Corp., No. 69026, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1205, at *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 28, 1996) (limiting damages to reliance losses caused by defendant's breach of
promise to promote plaintiff, plus differential between actual and promised pay until
plaintiff was terminated).
121. See, e.g., Romberger v. VFW Post 1881, 918 P.2d 993, 995 (Wyo. 1996)
("Recovery is not a matter of contract, but is predicated on the promisee's change in
position .... The amount of recovery is a question intertwined with the equities of the
transaction, necessarily creating a policy question to be decided by the court in the
exercise of its discretion.") (citation omitted).
122. 899 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
123. The plaintiff, an optician, had joined an optical business under a letter
agreement agreeing to an annual salary and stating an intention that as further
consideration for her services, the plaintiff would receive a one-third interest in the
business "as soon as it can be practically arranged." Id. at 702. The plaintiff moved to
Oregon and worked for more than two years. Id. She then left the business when the
parties were unable to agree on the terms of the ownership interest and brought an action
alleging breach of the agreement to convey the ownership. Id. at 702-03.
124. The Neiss court explained that liability under promissory estoppel as a remedy
for breach of promises that are too indefinite for contract is appropriate because
promissory estoppel would not generally entail "enforcement" of the same
kind or extent that the traditional remedies provide.... [P]romissory estoppel
remedies are more flexible in nature than contract remedies and are aimed at
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In Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Systems Development,"z the court
affirmed a judgment of reliance damages in an action by a manufacturer
of computer equipment against a potential buyer. The parties had been
unable to agree to material provisions in the purchase contract relating to
the characteristics of the goods, but the buyer had repeatedly urged the
manufacturer to begin production of the equipment and had assured it that
the contract would ultimately be signed. The seller's reliance on these
assurances gave rise to liability under Section 90 when the buyer
ultimately declined to enter the contract. The seller sought recovery of
its costs of production rather than its benefit of the bargain, and the court
awarded its expenses of production."
Neiss and Cyberchron suggest that, although a court has the authority
to award expectation damages in a Section 90 case, a finding of liability
under Section 90 may well depend on a plaintiff s willingness to limit her
claim to her reliance losses.
4. The "most important finding is the diminished role of reliance
in determining liability "; detriment is no longer required for
enforceability.
The most important of Farber and Matheson's findings is no longer
true.127 A legion of unhappy plaintiffs can bear witness to the continued
vitality of the actual reliance requirement, having discovered that a
commercial promise is not alone sufficient to ground a claim under
Section 90. '1 Not a single one of the surveyed opinions adopts Farber
compensating the promisee for damages that result from actions in reliance on
the promise, rather than providing comprehensive contract relief for the
breach of the indefinite promise itself.
Id. at 707.
125. 47 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995).
126. The appellate court did remand for further findings as to the amount of
overhead to be awarded under this measure. Id. at 46.
127. If indeed it ever was. Very little authority was offered for this amazing
claim.
128. Plaintiffs failed in various ways to establish that the promise actually induced
detrimental reliance:
(1) Failure to plead actual reliance: Sadowski v. Technical Career Insts., Inc.,
No. 93 Civ. 455 (PKL), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
1995) (dismissing claim where actual reliance not pleaded); Michaelian v.
State Compensation Ins. Fund, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 145-46 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (dismissing claim because no reliance pled beyond delay in service of
process in a bad faith action without merit).
(2) Failure to introduce proof of actual reliance: Ectel Corp. v. U.S. Robotics,
No. 95-16732, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33688 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 1996);
Boone v. Federal Express Corp., 59 F.3d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming
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summary judgment against employee who produced no evidence of reliance
on employer's promise of permanent employment); Stewart v. Whitmire
Distrib. Corp., No. 94-1096, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9544 (10th Cir. Apr.
26, 1995); Pitak v. Bell Ad. Network Servs., 928 F. Supp. 1354 (D.N.J.
1996) (no clear promise or reliance proved); see also Grayboyes v. General
Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 92-2515, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 1995) (no proof).
(3) Proving reliance that preceded the promise rather than followed it:
Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., 47 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying
recovery for amounts spent before the promise); Vana v. Mallinckrodt Med.,
Inc., No. 94-3424, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35488 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1995);
McKenny v. John V. Carr & Son, 922 F. Supp. 967 (D. Vt. 1996) (no
detriment shown where alleged reliance in transferring stock preceded
employment promise); Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., No. 94 C 50031, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4117 (N.D. 11. Apr. 2, 1996) (employer's alleged promise was
made in an exit interview after plaintiffs had already decided to retire); Reeves
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1996) (plaintiff had
already disclosed his idea to defendant at the time of the promise of
employment); Rothman v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, No. CV 44 99 14, 1995
Conn. Super. LEXIS 518 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1995) (plaintiff admitted
that he had planned to move before receiving job offer); Struck v. Hackett,
668 A.2d 411 (Me. 1995) (no reliance in leaving prior job because employee
left before employer made promise to hire); Martin v. Huntington Nat'l Bank,
No. L-95-077, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5051 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1995)
(no reliance in accepting job offer where plaintiff was being relocated
anyway); Paolucci v. Robinson Mem'l Hosp., No. 94-P-0022, 1995 Ohio
App. LEXIS 886 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1995) (no reliance in taking job
because employee had already taken job when employer made promise).
(4) The promise was withdrawn before reliance occurred: Variety Children's
Hosp. v. Century Med. Health Plan, 57 F.3d 1040 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (promisor
withdrew promise to cover treatment before treatment was given); Properties
Dev. v. Sto-Kent Lanes, No. 17059, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2169 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 24, 1995) (promisor revoked oral promise to contribute to cost of
constructing road before plaintiff relied).
(5) The promisor indicated that it would not perform before reliance occurred:
King v. Nevada Elec. Inv. Co., No. 94-4122, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15369
(10th Cir. June 21, 1995) (reliance unreasonable after parties disagreed); Coil
v. PB Diagnostic Sys., 50 F.3d 1115 (1st Cir. 1995) (faced with a conflict
between oral promises and written agreement, a reasonable person does not
rely on either but gets additional assurances); Williams v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, No. 93-56287, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5188 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995)
(notice of dispute makes reliance unreasonable without independent inquiry);
Grayboyes v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 92-2515, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4233 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1995) (no reliance on promise to pay
insurance benefits where plaintiff purchased house after learning that claim
would be denied).
(6) Promisee had no alternative to the reliance action taken: Shenker v. Lockheed
Sanders, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1996) (no reliance in forbearing to
apply for a position that plaintiff could not have obtained because of lack of
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qualifications); Miyano Mach. USA v. Dusan Zonar, L&D Mach., No. 92 C
2385, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 890 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (plaintiff's payment of
promissory note was not detrimental reliance on defendant's promise, because
plaintiff did not show that it could have done anything else than pay the note);
Schleicher v. Alliance Corporate Resources, Nos. 95APE03-3 11 to -312, 1995
Ohio App. LEXIS 5405 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1995) (reliance is a question
of fact depending in part on what alternatives plaintiff had); see also Moore
v. Ford Motor Co., 901 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. 11. 1995) (holding that on
remand, plaintiff seeking to enforce promise of distributorship and alleging
reliance in forgoing obtaining competing distributorship must demonstrate that
it would have qualified for and been offered the alternative).
(7) The alleged reliance constituted performance of a pre-existing duty under a
contract: Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros Thanksgiving Partners, 64
F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff was contractually obligated to establish
letter of credit at the time of defendant's alleged promise not to draw on it);
FDIC v. Patel, 46 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff was already
contractually committed to post letter of credit at time of beneficiary's alleged
promise not to draw on it); Baker v, Pease Co., No. 89-3985, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 550 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 1995) (merely continuing to work at at-will
job was not consideration for employer's promise to modify it to permanent
employment and did not constitute reliance on the promise); Tractor & Farm
Supply v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(alleged promise merely induced plaintiff to perform duties under existing
dealership contract); FGB Realty Advisors v. Seven Winds Realty, No. CV
94 0066260, 1995 Conn. Super LEXIS 3582 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22,
1995) (no actual reliance shown by making a payment that was already due);
Prentice v. UDC Advisory Servs., 648 N.E.2d 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(promissory estoppel is barred if the alleged detrimental reliance is the
performance of duties under a written contract, but may be pled in the
alternative until defendant admits the contract).
(8) The alleged reliance constituted performance of a pre-existing duty under a
statute or regulation: In re 375 Park Ave. Assocs., 182 B.R. 690 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (charitable organization could not show reliance by doing
what it was legally required to do at time of promise).
(9) The reliance did not cause any financial loss to plaintiff. Sterling Interiors
Group v. Haworth, Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,557 (S.D.N.Y. July
29, 1996) (plaintiff profited from its reliance); Mass Cash Register, Inc. v.
Comtrex Sys. Corp., 901 F. Supp. 404 (D. Mass. 1995); Grayboyes v.
General Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 92-2515, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 31, 1995); Piantes v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 929 (D.
Mass. 1995) (no loss shown except the profits plaintiff would have made if
promisor performed); Seta v. Reading Rock, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (stopping illegal drug use in reliance on employer's promise is not
detrimental reliance). But cf. Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co.,
916 P.2d 822, 829-30 (N.M. 1996) (promisee demonstrated necessary reliance
in its drilling of a wildcat well that turned out to be productive; promisee
relied by taking the risk that it would be dry).
(10) Although plaintiff relied and the reliance led to loss, the loss was suffered by




and Matheson's contention that actual reliance need not be proved so long
as the promise is made seriously in furtherance of a commercial activity
or Yorio and Thel's contention that actual reliance is unnecessary if the
promise is one that is likely to induce reliance. 29 Every single opinion
that mentioned the matter instead affirmed the Restatement requirement
that the plaintiff actually rely, some of them adding that the reliance must
be "substantial" as in the first Restatement version.130 Considered as a
group, these holdings lay to rest Farber and Matheson's assessment that
actual reliance is no longer an element of a claim of promissory estoppel.
This conclusion accords with other recent empirical studies of promissory
estoppel in appellate decisions."'
In making their case that actual reliance has never been necessary to
a promissory estoppel claim, Yorio and Thel focused on rare cases
involving charitable gifts, promises in consideration of marriage, and
1996) (shareholders' reliance on promise of Cadillac distributorship induced
their corporation to resign its franchise; shareholders had no Section 90
claim).
(11) The alleged reliance was caused by some other factor: Mecier v. Branon, 930
F. Supp. 165, 170 (D. Vt. 1996) (plaintiffs alleged reliance (not returning to
work sooner) was caused by his failure to obtain a doctor's approval, not
defendant's promise that his job was secure); Shumate v. Dugan, 934 S.W.2d
589 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (defendant's alleged reliance in failing to probate
will was the result of legal ignorance rather than reliance on a promise of
land); see also Neely v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 930 F. Supp. 360,
375 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (promisee gave promisor no reason to believe that he
was relying on the alleged promise in deciding to purchase the insurance).
A small minority of opinions in the survey held to the literal reading of Section 90
in requiring only that the promise induce some "action or forbearance" by the promisee.
E.g., Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Gofen & Glossberg, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 713 (N.D.
I1. 1995) (sufficient reliance is shown if the promise induces some action that would not
have otherwise occurred, here the forbearance to seek other sources of promised services).
Other decisions seem not to have emphasized the detrimental nature of the reliance. E.g.,
Cornelio v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. CV-92-510820, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 950
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1995) (plaintiff relied on promise to pay insurance claim by
not taking action against others to seize control of insurance proceeds paid to them);
Rooney v. Paul D. Osborne Desk Co., 645 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (reliance
on promise of benefits when plaintiff went from being commission salesman to corporate
officer was rendition of future services).
129. No case in the Westlaw or LEXIS databases has ever cited Farber and
Matheson or Yorio and Thel for either of these ideas.
130. E.g., Baer v. First Options of Chicago, No. 90 C 7207, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 512 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1995) (Illinois law).
131. E.g., Pham, Waning, supra note 2, at 1287 ("Contrary to the claims of
promise-focused theorists, the survey of state court cases since 1981 indicates that
detrimental reliance remains crucial to a promissory estoppel claim.") (footnote omitted).
1997:943 Section 90 as Catch-22 985
insurance promises, 32 ignoring the role that actual reliance played in
the far more numerous promissory estoppel cases involving employment,
franchise termination, lender-liability, and failed business
negotiations. 13  The authors dismissed the judicial unanimity in
requiring reliance as merely a make-weight argument,'3 used to bolster
decisions that are actually premised on the lack of a firm promissory
commitment. 35
The cases in the sample fail to support this contention. It is true that
in many cases, opinions affirming the necessity for reliance element also
involved some other missing element. 36 The most common defect was
132. Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 152-54,
156. This focus resulted from the authors' decision to concentrate their analysis on the
cases cited by the Restatement and similar authorities rather than on a sample of
contemporary decisions. The paucity of such cases in the reported decisions had already
been noted by Stanley Henderson as well-established in 1969. See supra note 103.
133. For example, roughly half the promissory estoppel cases in 1995-1996
involved employment-related claims.
134. Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 159
(characterizing judicial references to actual reliance as either gilding the lily or as being
inaccurate); see also Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 904
(stating that courts are "constrained to speak the language of reliance" and "most cases
denying recovery, purportedly for lack of reasonable reliance, can be readily explained
on other grounds."). Such statements should always excite skepticism. While it is
conceivable that courts are being systematically dishonest about the true grounds of their
rulings, it is highly unlikely that they are systematically following some deep principle of
which they are unaware. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 917, 922-23, 926-27 (1986) (expressing skepticism about a claim that people,
including judges, act rationally without awareness). "It is unfortunately very difficult to
discuss the possible reasons for rules of law without unwittingly conveying the impression
that these 'reasons' are the things which control the daily operations of the judicial
process." Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest, supra note 23, at 57.
135. Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 158-59.
Yorio and Thel, concede, however, that actual reliance serves as an additional reason for
enforcement under a promissory theory as evidencing the foreseeability of reliance as well
as evidencing the fact that the promise was made. Id. at 159.
136. A number of cases cited the absence of actual, detrimental reliance along with
other defects in the plaintiff's claims. See Vana v. Mallinckrodt Med., Inc., No. 94-
3424, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35488 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1995); Stewart v. Whitmire
Distrib. Corp., No. 94-1096, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9544 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant because plaintiffs evidence established
neither reliance nor foreseeability); Rollins v. Midland Steel Prods. Co., No. 94-3138,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9764 (6th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant because of lack of clear promise, reasonable reliance, or evidence of actual
reliance); Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, No. 93-56287, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
5188 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (notice of dispute makes reliance unreasonable); Keenan
v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (no actual reliance or mutual assent);
Piantes v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1995) (defendant gave
opinion, not promise, and plaintiffs reliance was profitable, not detrimental); Lark v. Post
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the absence of a clear and distinct promise, which is consistent with Yorio
and Thel's promise theory.'37
Many of the 1995-96 cases, however, denied promissory estoppel
claims on the sole ground that plaintiff had not demonstrated actual,
detrimental reliance. 13 The absence of actual reliance was decidedly
Newsweek Stations Conn., No. CV94 070 53 26, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2332 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 1995) (striking promissory estoppel claim because of existence of
written contract); In re Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (no clear and distinct promise to support plaintiff and no reliance shown); Winter
v. County Club, No. 17024, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4157 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20,
1995) (affirming summary judgment for defendant, plaintiff presented no evidence of
actual reliance, such as lost opportunities); Enlow v. Empire-Detroit Steel Div., Cyclops
Corp., No. 94-CA-80, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3628 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1995) (no
clear promise and no showing of actual reliance where employee looked for other jobs
after the "promise" of permanent employment was made); Corradi v. Soclof, No. 67586,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2162 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 1995) (affirming summary
judgment for employer in wrongful termination suit, in part because plaintiff did not
demonstrate any reliance on the alleged promise of permanent employment); Henning v.
Marriott Hotel & Resorts, No. 14926, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2119 (Ohio Ct. App. May
24, 1995) (no clear promise and no actual reliance by turning down other job offers);
Paolucci v. Robinson Mem'l Hosp., No. 94-P-0022, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 886 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1995) (promise disclaimed in employee handbook and no reliance
where employment preceded making of promise); Seta v. Reading Rock, Inc., 654 N.E.2d
1061 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (no promise not to terminate proved, and no detrimental
reliance in having stopped illegal drug use in reliance on discipline procedures); Ross v.
Times Mirror, Inc., 665 A.2d 580 (Vt. 1995) (handbook disclaimer of liability and no
showing of an oral promise or detrimental reliance).
137. It is not surprising to see the elements of specificity and reliance failing in
the same case. An equivocal promise is less likely to induce actual reliance.
138. Plaintiffs failure to establish actual detrimental reliance on the promise was
the only stated reason for denying promissory estoppel in numerous cases. See
Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros Thanksgiving Partners, 64 F.3d 227 (5th Cir.
1995) (plaintiffs alleged reliance was the performance of a pre-existing contractual
obligation); Boone v. Federal Express Corp., 59 F.3d 84 (8th Cir. 1995) (no evidence of
actual reliance on employer's oral promise of employment); Variety Children's Hosp. v.
Century Med. Health Plan, 57 F.3d 1040 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff's alleged reliance in
providing health care occurred after defendant withdrew its promise to pay for care);
FDIC v. Patel, 46 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff did not rely on promise of financing
where it was already legally obligated to repay loan and was unable to repay regardless
of defendant's promise); Baker v. Pease Co., No. 89-3985, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 550
(6th Cir. Jan. 9, 1995) (plaintiff proved no action or forbearance in reliance on promise
of permanent employment; continuing to work was not detrimental reliance); Diehl v.
Twin Disc, Inc., No. 94 C 50031, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4117 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 1996)
(employer's alleged promise was made in an exit interview after plaintiffs had already
decided to retire); Mass Cash Register, Inc. v. Comtrex Sys. Corp., 901 F. Supp. 404
(D. Mass. 1995) (promise of confidentiality proved but no showing of detrimental reliance
in lost profits because they depended on promisor's involvement); Tractor & Farm
Supply, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (alleged
reliance was the performance of a contractual duty); Kietlinski v. General Elec. Co., 886
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determinative, not merely make-weight, in these cases. The need to
prove actual detrimental reliance was also emphasized in the relative few
Section 90 decisions in plaintiffs' favor.'39
F. Supp. 994 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (no proof that plaintiff class members relied on
defendant's statements); Lerner v. General Elec. Co., No. 93-5787, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14374 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1995) (reliance was not demonstrated by employee's
failure to look for work elsewhere); Sadowski v. Technical Career Insts., No. 93 Civ. 455
(PKL), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995) (dismissing claim where
actual reliance not pleaded); Grayboyes v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 92-2515, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1995) (purchasing home was not actual
reliance on insurer's promise to pay); Miyano Mach. USA v. Dusan Zonar, L&D Mach.,
No. 92 C 2385, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 890 (N.D. I11. Jan. 25, 1995) (no reliance if
plaintiff maker of promissory note had no alternative to making payment); FGB Realty
Advisors v. Seven Winds Realty, No. CV 94 0066260, 1995 Conn. Super. 3582 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995) (plaintiff did not change position on alleged promise by
making a payment that was already due); Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411 (Me. 1995)
(plaintiff had changed position before alleged promise was made); Shumate v. Dugan, 934
S.W.2d 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to enforce oral promise to convey land
because claimants could not show that their claimed reliance in not probating a will was
caused by the promise); Doe v. Adkins, 674 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (no
reliance shown on promise of medical treatment); Paulson v. Vanlandingham, No. CA95-
07-045, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 426 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1996) (no proof of any
reliance on promise to repair easement); Martin v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. L-95-077,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5051 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1995) (because plaintiff was being
relocated anyway, her acceptance of employment was not detrimental reliance on
defendant's promise); Bobek v. Notre Dame College, No. 68586, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
3758 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1995) (affirming dismissal of employee's claim for breach
of oral promise not to terminate because no evidence of detrimental reliance was
presented); Properties Dev. v. Sto-Kent Lanes, Inc., No. 17059, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
2169 (Ohio Ct. App. May 24, 1995) (promisor revoked oral promise to contribute to cost
of constructing road before plaintiff relied); Gilbert v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., No.
67544, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1417 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1995) (no showing of injury
resulting from reliance on defendant's promise to give plaintiff a good recommendation
at the time he was fired); W&K Assocs., Ltd. v. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership, No.
07-96-0007-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4871 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1996); Stangel v.
Ramohalli, No. 05-95-00801-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3076 (Tex. Ct. App. July 16,
1996); cf. Resource Tech. Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 1996)
(even assuming that evidence of promise was not barred by the parol evidence rule,
plaintiffs could not recover under promissory estoppel because the alleged reliance did not
result in proven financial loss).
139. In some of these cases, the plaintiff obtained judgment. See Architectural
Metal Sys. v. Consolidated Sys., 58 F.3d 1227 (7th Cir. 1995) (general contractor relied
on subcontractor's bid by using it in entering prime contract); Percy J. Matherne
Contractor v. Grinnell Fire Protection Sys. Co., 915 F. Supp. 818 (M.D. La. 1995)
(same, granting summary judgment for plaintiff); Rooney v. Paul D. Osborne Desk Co.,
645 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff, reliance on
employer's promise of stock option was the rendering of future services).
In other cases, the defendant's motion for dismissal or summary judgment was
denied, or its grant was reversed. See In re 375 Park Ave. Assocs., 182 B.R. 690
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2. NORMATIVE CRITIQUE OF PROMISE THEORY
Farber and Matheson endorsed the trends they thought they had
discovered on economic policy grounds. They advanced the thesis that
legal enforcement of all promises that are made in the course of
commercial activity would foster a general attitude of trust and confidence
in commercial promisors. 4° The authors characterized this trust as a
"public good," whose preservation under Section 90 is in the long-term
interest of all commercial promisors. 141 They contended that
enforcement of all commercial, non-bargain promises will encourage
promisees to rely and will facilitate economic exchange, as does
enforcement of commercial, bargain promises. In line with these
arguments, the authors proffered a proposed Restatement, provision that
would replace both Section 71 (the consideration doctrine) and Section 90.
Under their recommendation, "[a] promise is enforceable when made in
furtherance of an economic activity." 143
It is ironic that the authors seem not to have appreciated the point
made in the quotation from economist Arthur Okun that introduced their
article and from which they took its title, The Invisible Handshake.'"4
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1995) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, noting that
charitable association could have relied on pledge by using it as collateral for a loan);
Schleicher v. Alliance Corp. Resources, Nos. 95APE03-311 to -312, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5405, at *15 n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1995) (reversing dismissal of plaintiffs
claim, court implies that proof of actual reliance requires that plaintiff show that he had
alternatives to alleged acts of reliance); Stahl v. Brush-Wellman, Inc., No. OT-95-01,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4538 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1995) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant, court notes that plaintiff must prove actual reliance on employer's
promise of non-retaliation); Vershoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 907
P.2d 1293 (Wyo. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for defendant, plaintiff must prove
detriment suffered by reliance on insurer's oral promise of insurance coverage).
140. Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 925-29.
141. Id. at 928.
142. Id. at 929 ("[T]he role of reliance in establishing liability and determining
damages in individual cases is on the decline-but reliance, in the form of trust, is on the
rise as the policy behind legal rules of promissory obligation.").
143. Id. at 930. The authors impose three additional qualifications: the promise
must be "credible"; it must be made by one with authority to bind the promisor; and the
promisor must anticipate benefit from the economic activity. Id. at 930-34.
144. The complete quotation was as follows:
Employers do, in fact, rely heavily on the "invisible handshake" as a
substitute for the invisible hand that cannot operate effectively in the career
labor market. While nonunion firms do make commitments that are morally,
and even legally, binding for a year ahead on wage rates (and, for some
salaried employees, on total earnings), they generally opt for implicit rather
than explicit contracts beyond that period. Apparently employers believe they
can influence the long-term expectations of workers favorably with nonbinding
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Okun expressed surprise that, in order to induce employee loyalty, most
nonunion employers apparently prefer to make nonbinding commitments
rather than binding contracts. 45 The employer's handshake is legally
"invisible," i.e., unenforceable. This observation should have led Farber
and Matheson to question their proposed rule that all such promises
should be made legally enforceable. The employers whom Okun
describes would already be making enforceable promises if they thought
the advantages of enforceability outweighed its costs. 's
Okun's observation also suggests that most employers would contract
out of a rule making their assurances prima facie enforceable.' 47 And,
to the extent that one may infer anything about actual commercial practice
from appellate reports, 48 that is what the sampled cases in fact
demonstrated. The implication of Okun's observation about employer
behavior is that the best default rule to save these transaction costs is non-
liability. 149
statements that preserve much of their own flexibility.
ARTHUR OKUN, PRICES AND QUANTITIES: A MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 89 (1981),
quoted in Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 903.
145. Id.
146. For a similar argument, see Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,
448 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fact that companies may face
market constraints against exploitation of employees does not imply that they also assume
contractual duties) (citing Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963) (business people often fail to assume
contractual duties)).
147. Cf. Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 935-36
(noting that promisors could avoid liability under their proposed rule by disclaiming an
intention to be legally bound). The authors seem vulnerable to a criticism they later
leveled at an argument made by Duncan Kennedy: "As to efficiency, Professor Kennedy
generally overlooks one of the basic lessons of economics: firms are not passive in the
face of legal rules." Id. at 944.
148. It is highly unlikely that the events described in appellate case reports are a
representative sample of all commercial practices, so one should be reluctant to draw any
conclusions about actual practice from such a source. One cannot even conclude that
appellate case reports accurately reflect the nature of commercial disputes or of the
majority of litigated cases. MACAULAY ET AL., LAW IN ACTION, supra note 100, at 261-
62. One can, however, cautiously conclude that it is not uncommon for commercial
promisors to couch their statements in disclaimers if only because of the relative frequency
of such cases in the appellate reports.
149. This is not to suggest that the current rule is in practice more efficient than
the proposed rule at the transaction stage. The case law demonstrates that many
commercial promisors already incur the costs of disclaiming liability under the current
rule. The choice of a different default rule, however, might significantly affect the
judicial enforcement costs, for example, with respect to the burden of proof or the




Farber and Matheson might respond that, even if it is not the rule
that most commercial promisors would choose, a presumption of
enforceability is an efficient default rule because it is an "information-
forcing" default rule of the sort that was later identified by Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner. 150 Ayres and Gertner analyzed the foreseeability rule
in the law of contract damages as being efficient not because it is the rule
that most parties would choose-it isn't -but because by penalizing
the promisee who fails to disclose to the promisor the consequential
damage that breach would cause, the rule forces the promisee to disclose
information that will permit the promisor to make efficient decisions about
whether to enter the contract and how much to expend in performing
it. 52 Anticipating Ayres and Gertner's analysis, Farber and Matheson
claimed that their default rule would force employers and other
commercial promisors to disclose their intention not to be legally bound:
"[W]here potential promisors are less than confident of their future
conduct, the proposed rule fosters better information transmission by
encouraging them to reveal their uncertainties. This information will help
to insure [sic] that promisors will be trusted only insofar as they are
worthy of trust." 53
But this argument confuses a promisor's willingness to be legally
bound with his willingness to perform a serious promise. ' As shown
above in Part II.A, the two are both conceptually and practically distinct.
A commercial promisor's decision to opt for enforceability depends on his
estimate of the relative costs and benefits of enforceability, not simply on
the seriousness of the promise or the commitment to perform. He may
make an unenforceable promise with a firm intention to perform. A
150. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres &
Gertner, Filling Gaps] ("penalty defaultfl" rules intentionally contradict what the parties
would have agreed to in order to induce parties to make efficient disclosures of
information); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). But parties engaged in
strategic bargaining may have incentives to withhold information that the default rule
mandates be disclosed. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
151. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 150, at 93-95.
152. See id. at 97-100.
153. Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 936; cf. Goetz
& Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at 1279-80 (explaining that a rule enforcing
all non-reciprocal promises will minimize risk by providing better information to the
promisee about the quality of the promise, but may lead to promisees over-relying).
154. See supra Part II.A. Yorio and Thel make the same mistake of confusing a
promisor's commitment to perform a serious promise with his willingness to be legally
bound to answer in damages if he fails.
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promisee may be more reasonable in relying on an unenforceable promise
made by a person with a good reputation than upon an enforceable
promise made by a less trustworthy promisor.'
The information-forcing argument is premised on inconsistent
assumptions about the promisee's legal awareness. Farber and Matheson
assume that employees will be aware of their proposed default rule-that
an employer's promise is prima facie enforceable-because it is only this
assumption that leads to the transaction cost-reducing benefits of trust and
reliance. " If, however, the promisee is assumed to be aware of the
default rule, then the promisor's intention and level of commitment will
be apparent to the promisee regardless of the default rule chosen. The
analogy to information-forcing rules is inapt. Unlike the disclosure of
individualized information about potential consequential losses that would
result upon breach, the disclosure of the legal effect of the promise will
not add to the promisee's knowledge anything that could not be deduced
from knowledge of the default rule itself.
More important, even if the disclosure of enforceability added to the
promisee's information, a default rule mandating disclosure of
unenforceability is likely to be inefficient because it conflicts with the
promisor's natural incentives. Farber and Matheson's rule would require
the employer in most cases to disclose unfavorable information-
unenforceability-perhaps with an explanation of the degree of
commitment short of legal enforceability the employer intends to
undertake. The employer would have an incentive to obscure or gloss
over the disclosure.' The opposite default rule would give the rare
employer who wished to make a legally binding, non-bargain promise the
incentive to disclose favorable information. As seen above, the whole
point of making an enforceable promise is that the promisee realize and
value its enforceability. On the assumption that employees have some
background understanding of the enforceability of a promise, and that the
default rule chosen will define that understanding, then there is no reason
to believe that Farber and Matheson's rule is more efficient than its
opposite.
155. The Restatement recognizes the value that a promisee might put on an
unenforceable promise. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 78 cmt. a.
156. Farber and Matheson's reference to "trust" is problematic. See Farber &
Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 929. It seems odd to say that making
an employer's promise legally enforceable fosters trust in the employer. Rather, one
relies on enforceability precisely because one does not trust the promisor.
157. A similar problem in criminal procedure involves the Miranda warning.
Because a suspect's silence does not serve the interests of police officers, they are likely




Closely related to promise theorists are consent theorists, of whom
Randy Barnett is undoubtedly the foremost proponent." 8 Barnett views
the creation of an enforceable contract obligation as equivalent to the
transfer of a property entitlement (to performance) from the promisor to
the promisee. 19  From the natural law axiom that the transferor's
consent is essential to a transfer of property," Barnett derives the
principle that all contract obligation, whether bargain contract or Section
90, properly derives solely from the promisor's manifestation of consent
to incur legal liability. 6' The consent theory thus rejects both the,
consideration doctrine and the protection of reliance as either necessary
or sufficient justifications for promissory enforcement. Although he
rejects promise theory, Barnett echoes Fried in arguing that a promisor
is not bound because of the promisee's reliance; rather, reliance is
justified because the promisor manifested consent to be legally bound. 162
158. Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27. Another is Mary Becker, see
Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, supra note 11, at 131. Elements of consent
theory can be found in the work of the law and economics school insofar as they affirm
the value to the promisor of being able to make a binding, non-bargain promise. See
Posner, Gratuitous Promises, supra note 12; see also Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises,
supra note 16. Professor Kostritsky might classify herself as a consent theorist, given her
"assent-based" theory of Section 90 liability, but she seems to focus more on exchange
elements in the creation of liability than solely on the promisor's expression of consent.
See Kostritsky, A New Theory, supra note 11.
Barnett contrasts consent and promise theories in Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems
with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1022 (1992). He argues that because
they do not require intention to be legally bound, promise theories have difficulty stating
which promises ought to be enforceable. Id.
159. Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 291-95.
160. Id. at 296-300. The validity of this axiom will not be addressed here. But
see Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest, supra note 23, at 59-60 (suggesting that to
consider a promise of future goods a property interest in a credit economy is to beg the
question).
161. Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 300-09; Barnett, Death of
Reliance, supra note 11, at 534-36. Barnett's approach resembles that of continental civil
law legal systems, in which the basis of contractual liability is manifestation of consent
to be legally bound. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 134 (rev. ed. 1954) [hereinafter POUND, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW] ("Modern continental
law, apart from certain requirements of proof. . . asks only, Did [sic] the promisor
intend to create a binding duty?"); Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to
Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1009 (1959).
162. See Barnett, Death of Reliance, supra note 11, ar 522. Much like Fried, see
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 44, Barnett and Becker conclude that many
putative promissory estoppel cases, including Hoffman, are actually cases of
misrepresentation, and suggest development of a tort of negligent misrepresentation to
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As can be seen, the promisor-choice version of contract presented
above in Part II is a version of the consent theory of contract, albeit based
on different justifications. 163 Barnett's application of his consent theory
to promissory estoppel claims, however, yields results quite different from
those described in Part II because of his principles of contract
interpretation. Barnett subscribes to an objective theory of contract
interpretation under which one may conclusively infer "consent to be
legally bound" from behavior that does not expressly state consent.' 54
Barnett thus distinguishes "assent" to be bound, a subjective state of
mind, from "consent" to be bound, a speech act manifesting the
assent. 1" Legal liability turns on the latter, even when actual assent is
absent. This differentiates consent theory from a "will" theory of
contract.'66 Moreover, the speech act of consent can be implied as well
as express, so that no expression of an intention to be bound is
required. 67 Thus, Barnett views bargain promises as manifesting the
requisite consent to be bound regardless of the promisor's actual,
unexpressed understanding of the consideration doctrine," Similarly,
he contends that a Section 90 promisor can manifest consent to be bound
handle such cases. Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra note 11. Several cases in
the 1995-1996 survey appear to be decided on misrepresentation or equitable estoppel
grounds rather than under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Hurwitz v.
Bocian, 670 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that defendant's oral agreement
to give plaintiff equal partnership in business was a promise made without intention to
perform, a misrepresentation that overcomes statute of frauds for contracts for the sale of
securities, U.C.C. § 8-319).
163. The idealized theory of Part II justifies enforcement on the basis of a view
about the utility and purpose of contract law as a resource for market traders rather than
on the basis of natural law. In my view, Barnett's property analogy is unnecessary and
inadequate to justify enforcement of contract promises. Property rights can be altered
without the holder's consent, for example, by legislation. Barnett does affirm the value
of a consent theory under principles of utility, however. I am in complete agreement with
Barnett's view that enforceability should depend on the promisor's consent to
enforcement, though not with his contentions about what should count as consent.
164. Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 304-09.
165. Id. at 297-98, 303, 305.
166. Id. at 300-01, 303.
167. Id. at 312.
168. Id. at 306-07, 313-14. Jean Braucher argues that Barnett's objective
definition of "consent" is highly problematic for the rest of his theory. Jean Braucher,
Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 697, 703-06 (1990). She points out that social and interpretive norms give
rise to regulatory rules of contract construction and enforcement and it is only within such
rules that "consent" is "found." Id. Yet, consent so broadly defined could be extended
to all forms of civil obligation, including those arising from the rules of negligence. Id.
Braucher's critique robs the consent theory of its normative claim that contract liability
is grounded in exercises of personal autonomy.
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without referring explicitly to enforceability, as for example by "standing
silently by" as the promisee relies on the promise."6 But reliance is not
necessary in cases in which the promisor "apparently intended to be
legally bound by the promise.""'° Such an intention can be manifested
by making a promise in a bargain exchange that involves a formal bar to
enforcement, such as the statute of frauds;"1 making a promise in an
implicit bargain exchange for the promisee's reliance; making firm
offers or bids;" and making promises in conjunction with already
enforceable bargain promises, such as contract modifications. 74 Thus,
whereas the promisor-choice theory of contract obligation would require
the promisor to state explicitly his intention to be legally bound, Barnett's
consent theory requires no such signal.
1. DESCRIPTIVE CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY
Barnett cautioned that his theory may not accurately describe judicial
beliefs about Section 90.'11 Nevertheless, the 1995-96 case sample
contains several decisions suggesting that a manifestation of consent to be
legally bound may be becoming essential to liability under Section 90.
For example, in Orback v. Hewlett-Packard Co., the court granted
summary judgment against the plaintiffs in a wrongful termination suit on
the grounds that the employer had failed to manifest a willingness to be
legally bound to the disciplinary policies in question.'" The court
reasoned that, under Colorado law, the manifested intent required under
Section 90 was the same as that required to create a contract implied in
fact.7" In Omega Engineering v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1 9 the court
found that the seller's statements to the buyer could be interpreted to
169. Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 314-15.
170. Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra note 11, at 449.
171. Id. at 470-85 (formal bars include the statute of frauds, parol evidence rule,
and illusory promises).
172. Id. at 455-57.
173. Id. at 457-60.
174. Id. at 460-69 (contract modifications, assurances incident to a bargain, and
pension promises).
175. E.g., Barnett, Death of Reliance, supra note 11, at 527 ("[W]hat students
may know and law professors probably should know about the death of reliance is
probably unknown to judges. Judges may do in practice what these scholars describe
them as doing, but they are not aware of it.").
176. 909 F. Supp. 804 (D. Colo. 1995), aff'd, 97 F.3d 429 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1846 (1997).
177. Id. at 810.
178. Id. at 808-09.
179. 908 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Conn. 1995); see discussion infra Part IV.D.
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constitute a "'present intention . . . to undertake immediate contractual
obligations""' as required under Connecticut's law of promissory
estoppel.' The language of these decisions requires the promisor to
engage in a form of intentional contract-creation which amounts to
manifestation of consent to enter a contract.
Barnett's consent theory also accounts for the courts' general
acceptance of the rule that a commercial promisor's clear expression of
a refusal to be legally bound immunizes him from Section 90 liability.
Many courts have extended this rule to deny recovery to sophisticated
promisees who should have known that if the promisor intended to be
legally bound, he would have proceeded in a more formal manner.'2
Such decisions support what might be called the negative half of the
consent theory of Section 90, which is both traditional and largely non-
controversial: one who expresses an intention not to be legally bound
usually will not be." 3
The first descriptive problem with Barnett's theory is its standard for
determining what counts as manifestation of consent to be legally bound.
Contrary to Barnett's view that deliberately inducing reliance on a
promise counts as manifestation, the cases discussed below in Parts III.B
and III.C demonstrate that even where reliance is explicitly requested by
the promisor, the court may find that the parties were aware that the
promisor did not intend to be legally bound. 184
Barnett's theory suffers from a second, more serious, descriptive
problem because it rejects actual reliance as essential to liability under
Section 90. For Barnett, as for the promise theorists, the Section 90
promise becomes binding when it is made, regardless of the presence or
absence of subsequent reliance by the promisee. 85 Because he contends
that actual reliance should be unnecessary to enforceability under Section
90, Barnett's consent theory cannot account for the courts' continuing
insistence on actual reliance and their refusal to enforce non-bargain
promises in its absence.
180. Id. at 1092 (quoting D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame
High Sch., 520 A.2d 217, 221-22 (Conn. 1987)). Apparently, such manifested intention
is an element of promissory estoppel in this jurisdiction.
181. Neither Orback nor Omega involved a promise accompanied by a statement
of enforceability, however, so each would fall short of the standard I proposed in Part II.
182. See discussion infra Part IV.
183. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 21 & cmt. b.
184. E.g., Puri v. Blockbuster Music Retail, No. 95-C-50018, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18819 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1995); see discussion infra part IV.B.
185. Barnett, Death of Reliance, supra note 11, at 523-25, 533-34.
1997:943
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
2. NORMATIVE CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY
Barnett proposes that all commercial promises be presumed to have
been made with the intention that they be legally binding. This latter
presumption conflicts with the most probable account of commercial
promising, however, as shown above."8 7 Most commercial promisors
do not want their non-bargain promises to be legally binding and will
contract around a rule that makes them prima facie binding. Thus, one
cannot presume that a commercial promise manifests consent to be legally
bound without doing violence eithet to the probable intention of the
promisor or to the notion of consent itself. If consent is not manifested,
then a promisee's expectation that the promise is enforceable becomes
unreasonable. Indeed, the more legally sophisticated the parties are, the
less reason a promisee has to infer consent from a non-bargain, informal
commercial promise.
Barnett might respond that Section 90 itself makes the promisor's
reliance-inducing behavior interpretable as a manifestation of consent.
Thus, if Corbin promises Williston that he will grant him a gratuitous
easement for business purposes, both parties would be aware that Section
90 would enforce the promise upon Williston's reliance, and both
therefore would understand Corbin to be manifesting consent at the time
he made the promise if he later stood silently by as Williston proceeded
to act in reliance. But courts do not interpret Section 90 this broadly, so
the interpretive inference would not be warranted. No court that I have
found within the sample or anywhere else has held or implied that a
promisor manifested assent to be bound, or that a promisee's reliance was
foreseeable, on the grounds that both parties should have known that
courts enforce reliance-inducing promises under Section 90. The
interpretation of the promisor's behavior as consent to be bound depends
on the default rule that is in effect at the time of the promise. 8' In
choosing to enforce reliance-inducing promises, courts establish grounds
for future, legally sophisticated promisees to manifest consent to be
legally bound. It begs the question to argue that it is a manifestation of
consent to stand silently by as a promisee relies.
186. Id. at 528. He argues for a contrary presumption for non-commercial
promises. Id.
187. See supra Part II. A possible exception to this generalization is the
understanding of subcontractors and contractors that a subcontractor's bid is a firm offer
if it is used in making a general contractor's prime bid. See Franklin M. Schultz, The
Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI.
L. REV. 237 (1952); see also Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra note 11, at 459-
60.
188. Craswell, Default Rules, supra note 51, at 508.
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Thus, as with the promise theories, Barnett's proposed default rule
is overbroad. Foreseeable reliance cannot alone signify an intention to be
legally bound because most promises induce foreseeable reliance. A
promisor who intended to keep an unenforceable promise would also be
expected to "stand silently by" as the promisee relied on performance so
long as he expected to perform the promise. Without a rule that is
overbroad, such as that every commercial promise is per se enforceable
unless a contrary manifestation appears, Barnett cannot apply his consent
theory to a non-bargain promise without some additional marker of
enforceability.
C. Judicial Refusal to Enforce Commercial Promises on the Basis of
Promise or Consent Theories
To the extent that one can discern a trend in contemporary judicial
decisions, it is distinctly contrary to enforcement of the type of
commercial promises that the promise and consent theorists contend
should be enforceable. For example, in Mass Cash Register v. Comtrex
Systems Corp.89 during the course of negotiations, the defendant, an
equipment manufacturer, induced the plaintiff, an equipment distributor,
to disclose a trade secret: the identity of a national account. " The
defendant induced the disclosure by promising to share the marketing of
the account with the plaintiff. It later breached its promise by selling to
the account directly. The court found, however, that the plaintiff would
have lost the account anyway because the buyer was dissatisfied with the
equipment the plaintiff had been supplying and the plaintiff had no other
source of supply.' 9 ' The court denied the plaintiffs claim for
promissory estoppel on grounds that the plaintiffs reliance led to no
actual financial loss. 192
The manufacturer's promise of confidentiality would be enforceable
under the standards of both the promise and consent theorists because it
was seriously made in the course of business negotiations, the promisee's
reliance (disclosure) was specifically requested, and the reliance benefitted
the promisor. The court's imposition of the additional Section 90
189. 901 F. Supp. 404 (D. Mass. 1995).
190. Id. at 412.
191. Id. at 420.
192. Id. The court apparently did not consider whether the plaintiff lost whatever
it might have been able to obtain from the defendant as consideration for disclosing the
account. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the
Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1388-89 (1985)
(referring to such losses as the cost of modification).
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requirement that the promisee suffer a reliance loss is inconsistent with
both consent and promise theories.".
Neither promise nor consent theory can explain the denial of
enforcement if the promisee's reliance is the performance of a pre-existing
legal duty, as was the case in Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros
Thanksgiving Partners."9  In a dispute arising from a complex real-
estate transaction, one of the buyers claimed that it had established a $5
million letter of credit in the seller's favor only after the seller promised
not to draw on it. When the seller did draw on the letter and sued the
buyer for breach, the buyer filed a counterclaim alleging that the seller's
promise was binding under Section 90. The court held that the necessary
reliance element was not met because the buyer was contractually
obligated to establish the credit for the seller's benefit at the time of the
alleged promise.
The precise doctrinal grounds of this decision are unclear. Perhaps
it rests on the theory that performance of a pre-existing legal duty cannot
be consideration for a new promise,191 perhaps on the theory that the
promise was not the cause-in-fact of the injury caused by reliance."9
In either case, however, whether based on bargain theory or tort, the
holding conflicts with the proposition that a serious, non-bargain promise
made in furtherance of commercial activity is sufficient for liability under
Section 90 whenever the promisee's action is beneficial to the promisor.
Nor can promise or consent theory explain cases that require the
promisee to demonstrate that she had a real alternative to the alleged
detrimental reliance. In Moore v. Ford Motor Co., Moore sought to
enforce an oral promise that he would be granted a Ford distributorship,
alleging that he relied on Ford's promise by forgoing an opportunity to
obtain a Pontiac distributorship that was offered to him while the
discussions with Ford were taking place. In reversing summary judgment
for the defendant and remanding the case for trial, the court noted that,
in order to establish a claim for promissory estoppel, Moore would have
to prove (1) that a Pontiac dealership was available, (2) that Moore would
have met Pontiac's dealer qualifications, and (3) that Pontiac would have
made him a firm offer. 98
193. This case could have instead been decided on the ground that, while the
promise was enforceable, the breach of the promise did not cause harm to the plaintiff.
194. 64 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1995).
195. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 73.
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 546 (1977) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS].
197. 901 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. 11. 1995).
198. Id. at 1301.
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As with the pre-existing duty rule, the existence of an alternative to
the promisee's reliance action is logically necessary to prove that the
promise was a but-for cause of the reliance and the ensuing loss. But if
Section 90 promises were binding because of promise or consent, the
promisee's available alternatives would be irrelevant to their
enforceability.'
Finally, neither promise nor consent theory can explain why
promissory estoppel is denied if, before actual reliance occurs, the
promise is withdrawn or the promisor disputes his obligation." Both
theories claim that a contractual obligation arises at the moment the
commercial promise is made or consent to be legally bound is manifested.
As a contract, this obligation should be unaffected by a subsequent,
unilateral repudiation by the promisor, as is the case with bargain
promises."t But plaintiffs routinely lose Section 90 claims if their
reliance takes place after the promise is withdrawn or disavowed.2°'
These cases undermine any argument that Section 90 is a mode of
unilateral contract formation, arising solely from a promise made in
appropriate circumstances.'
199. See Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 159
& n.334. It could be argued that the existence of an alternative is necessary not for proof
of Section 90 liability but for proof of damages caused by the breach of an enforceable
Section 90 promise. But if expectation damages are the usual measure of Section 90
liability, then the existence of alternatives to reliance is irrelevant to the damage causation
issue.
200. See cases cited supra note 128, paras. (4)-(5) (cases in which the reliance
element was not satisfied because the promise was withdrawn before reliance occurred,
and cases in which the reliance element was not satisfied because the promisor indicated
that it would not perform before reliance occurred).
201. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 253 (repudiation is breach of
contract); U.C.C. § 2-610 (1995). Barnett's consent theory does not address the effect
of a promisor's unilateral repudiation of a promise before reliance can occur. It may be
that his natural law analogy of contract to property conveyance would lead him to
conclude that the conveyance of an entitlement to performance should be as irrevocable
as is the conveyance of title to property.
202. See cases cited supra note 128, paras. (4)-(5).
203. Although none of them adopts the analogy, the withdrawn-promise cases
suggest that the promise is a form of offer and the reliance a form of acceptance necessary
to create the contract. Withdrawal of the "offer" before "acceptance" terminates the
offeree's power to create a contract under traditional contract formation doctrine. This
interpretation does not, of course, rescue the death of reliance thesis, which posits that no
response by the promisee is necessary to make the promise enforceable. It also conflicts
with the position taken in the Restatement that agreement (a manifestation of mutual
assent) of the parties is not necessary to the formation of a contract under Section 90. See
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 3 cmts. a, e; id. § 17 cmt. e.
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D. The Role of Reliance
For different reasons, both the promise and the consent theories
would eliminate the reliance element of Section 90 by arguing that a
serious, non-bargain commercial promise is the equivalent of a bargain
contract: it should be immediately enforceable to the extent of the
promisee's expectation interest without regard to the promisee's reliance
or other expression of assent. Under both theories, the courts' continuing
requirement of actual reliance for Section 90 liability is illogical and
unnecessary.
This attack on the reliance requirement is puzzling because it is not
logically necessary to either the promise or consent theories of Section 90.
Neither theory specifies the precise content, express or implied, of the
promise that the law will enforce. Thus, for example, under Barnett's
analysis a person who manifests an intention to be legally bound to
perform a promise might also expressly or implicitly condition the
promisee's power to enforce the promise on her actual reliance, or might
expressly or implicitly reserve a power to rescind the promise at any time
before such reliance. In such a case, the reliance condition would define
the scope of the promise, but would not affect its legal enforceability.
Yet, both promise and consent theorists argue that a reliance requirement
in Section 90 is inconsistent with their normative claims.
The court's continuing insistence on reliance can be explained both
practically and theoretically. As a practical matter, the most obvious
explanation is that courts are following the rule laid down in Section 90
without reference to its rationale. Most courts are inclined to treat
Restatement sections as they would statutes, once they have been adopted
for that jurisdiction. Those courts who do pause to reflect on the rule
doubtless are influenced by its popular name: "Estoppel" has always
turned on the reliance induced by the defendant's behavior.
Promise and consent theorists have also rationalized judicial
insistence on the reliance requirement on process grounds: actual
substantial reliance supplies some evidence of both the promise and the
foreseeability of the reliance.' It may also be that the demand for
particularized reliance in the employment cases is based on skepticism
about the alleged promise and a desire to keep the case away from a jury.
Likewise, a finding that a legally sophisticated promisee could not
reasonably or foreseeably have relied on an alleged oral assurance might
be a judicial euphemism for doubts about the plaintiffs credibility. But
if this were the case, one would expect at least some judges to be more
204. See Yorio & Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, supra note 11, at 159-
1000
Section 90 as Catch-22
candid about their views. Instead, the bench is unanimous in its demand
for actual reliance.
To judges uncomfortable with Section 90, reliance might also be seen
to supply the two traditional elements of bargain contract that Section 90
promises would otherwise lack: consideration and mutual assent.'
Because all commercial promises are presumably made to induce reliance,
the promisee's reliance can often be seen as the product of an implicit
bargain, a reaction that is consciously sought by the promisor in making
the promise and consciously "given" by the promisee in respect of the
promise.' Thus, reliance fulfills the formal and substantive functions
of consideration in a bargained-for exchange. 2' Conversely, reliance
supplies the element of mutual assent if one sees the reliance-inducing
promise as a form of unilateral contract offer that the promisee can accept
by reliance.' This analysis neatly fits the "withdrawn promise" cases
discussed above. Yet it also prompts the difficult question whether the
promisee can deliberately rely in order to create a binding obligation, in
the way that a unilateral contract offeree may tender performance in order
to do so.' Outside the classic unilateral contract offer context, I have
found no case holding or suggesting that a promisee may rely in order to
create a binding obligation or that such reliance would be either
reasonable or foreseeable.
Courts may consider that holding a promisor to a non-bargain
promise in the absence of promisee reliance would often be unfair because
of the absence of reciprocity or mutuality that reliance would otherwise
supply. For example, under the rule that employs Section 90 to prevent
subcontractors from withdrawing bids that have been relied upon by
prime contractors in making their bids, courts uniformly deny
enforcement if the prime contractor engages in "bid-shopping" or "bid-
chopping" after being awarded the prime contract and before accepting
205. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90 cmt. a (consideration is not
necessary for enforcement under Section 90). The Restatement also confirms that
agreement (a manifestation of mutual assent) of the parties is not necessary to the
formation of a contract under Section 90. See id. § 3 cmts. a, e; id. § 17 cmt. e.
206. See Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra note 11, at 455-57.
207. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 799-
802, 806-07, 810-15 (1941) (explaining that, as a legal formality, consideration fulfills
evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions; it also supplies the substantive basis for
contract liability in protecting autonomy and promisee reliance and preventing unjust
enrichment).
208. Several commentators have analogized the Section 90 promise to an offer to
enter a contract. See, e.g., Pham, Waning, supra note 2, at 1287-88. Few, however,
have analogized the reliance to an acceptance.
209. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 45.
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the subcontractor's bid.210 If the promise or consent theory were valid
and the subcontractor's bid were a firm offer regardless of reliance, then
it should make no difference that the prime contractor seeks to obtain
better terms from other contractors before accepting the offer. Yet the
injustice of holding the subcontractor to the bid while permitting the
prime contractor to shop around for better terms has led courts to release
the subcontractor under such circumstances. 1 In effect, these decisions
refuse to infer an implied promise to keep the subcontractor's bid open
for any longer and to any greater degree than is necessary to protect the
actual reliance of the prime contractor.
In contrast to the formalism of promise and consent theories, a
promisor-choice theory of contract can rationalize the courts' continuing
demand for actual reliance. A requirement of actual reliance on a non-
bargain promise does not interfere seriously with a promisor's election to
use enforceability to induce beneficial reliance. If the promisor's sole
purpose in making the promise enforceable is to induce promisee reliance,
and if the promisor disavows the promise before the promisee relies on
it, then non-enforcement does not frustrate the functions of enforcement.
If legal rules permit the promisor to revoke enforceable promises before
the promisee relies, the risk (and cost) of promising will be reduced at no
cost to the promisee. A condition of revocability before reliance occurs
does not undermine the utility of enforceability in inducing beneficial
reliance so long as a promisee's actual reliance is fully protected when it
does occur.
But while it is true that a promisee's foreseeable reliance is a
necessary condition to enforcement under Section 90, not all reliance is
considered equal to this purpose. As the next section will argue, many
contemporary courts require the promisee to demonstrate enforcement
reliance, an act or forbearance based on a reasonable belief that the
promise is legally enforceable. These decisions thus vindicate a major
premise of promise and consent theory-that liability should require the
promisor's manifested intention to incur legal liability. Contrary to the
expansive predictions of some of those theorists, however, the judicial
210. See, e.g., Lahr Constr. Corp. v. J. Kozel & Son, 640 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y.
Super. Ct. 1996). If reliance is found, such offers would be enforceable under SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 87(2), which is comparable to Section 90.
211. See 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 2.31, at 292 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993); see also Preload Technology, Inc. v. A.B.&J. Constr.
Co., 696 F.2d 1080, 1089 (5th Cir. 1983); Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr.
Corp., 493 F.2d 352, 358 (8th Cir. 1974); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757,
760 (Cal. 1958); Haselden-Langley Constructors v. D.E. Farr & Assocs., 676 P.2d 709
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Lahr Constr. Corp. v. J. Kozel & Son, 640 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y.
Super. Ct. 1996).
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adoption of this principle serves to restrict rather than to enlarge liability
under Section 90, erecting a barrier not mentioned in the text of the rule.
IV. THE GROWING JUDICIAL INSISTENCE ON ENFORCEMENT RELIANCE
IN THE COMMERCIAL CONTEXT
It now seems apparent that legal doctrine in the courts is evolving in
sympathetic response to the aversion of commercial actors toward the risk
of estoppel liability. Many of the opinions reported in 1995 and 1996
lend support to the thesis that, in order to prevail on a promissory
estoppel claim, a commercial promisee must now demonstrate not only
that her reliance was reasonable in light of the likelihood that the
promisor would perform, but also that she had a reasonable belief that the
promise was legally enforceable when made. Excluding those promises
that are already enforceable under bargain contract theory, this requires
that the promisor manifest an affirmative intention that the promise be
enforceable at the time of the promise. As the promise and consent
theorists insist, the ensuing reliance is reasonable because the promise is
enforceable, not vice versa.
Although the promisor's manifestation of intention to be bound is
critical to these cases, the court's focus is usually on the promisee's actual
or presumed understanding of that manifestation. Enforcement is denied
if the court finds that the promisee was or should have been aware that
the promise was not intended to create an enforceable obligation. In the
following three situation-types, the promisee's actual or presumed legal
awareness proves fatal to her ability to enforce a reliance-inducing
commercial promise.
A. Enforcement Reliance Prevented by the Presumption of At-Will
Employment in Employee Claims of Wrongful Termination
One of the most well-established examples of the requirement of
enforcement reliance is in the refusal to apply promissory estoppel to
enforce equivocal promises of non-terminable employment made by
employers to employees. Over half of all the cases in the sample
involved claims of wrongful termination from employment. These
employees contended that they were not at-will employees and that their
termination violated either an oral promise of permanent employment or
a promised discharge procedure. Almost all of these claims failed,
usually on a motion for summary judgment. The primary reason for the
lack of success is that courts require such employees to demonstrate not
that they reasonably relied on the likelihood that the employer would
perform its promise, but instead that they had reasonable grounds to
believe that the promises constituted a legally enforceable modification of
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their at-will status. This requirement often took the form of a demand
that the employee prove a sufficiently "clear and definite," or
"unambiguous," promise of permanent employment to alter their
presumptive at-will status. 212
It may be instructive to sample the'sorts of statements that courts
have found to be inadequate to this task, especially in light of Farber and
Matheson's claims about the value of trust in the employment
relationship. Employees have been held to have had no right to rely on
language such as the following 23 as a promise of permanent
employment: "Don't worry about being fired" ;214 "You will be here
until you retire"; 215 "I have no intention of firing you"; 21 6 dYou will
not have to be concerned about job security because you have a job here
as long as you want or until you retire" ;217 "You will have continued
and secure employment"; "You will have a job until you retire; we'll
have you for the next twelve years" ;219 "Your position will never be
taken away and you can have it as long as you want it";' "You have
212. At other times, the employee was barred because he could not establish an
expectation of enforcement because the employer had disclaimed any intention of creating
an enforceable obligation. These cases will be discussed infra Part IV.B.
213. Some of these cases pre-date the survey years of 1995 and 1996, but were
cited by cases in the survey.
214. Gregory v. Interface Flooring Sys., No. 93-4261, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
36182, at *20 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 1995) (not a clear and unambiguous promise of non-
termination under Ohio law).
215. Snyder v. AG Trucking, 57 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 1995) (promise not
sufficiently specific).
216. Mariner v. Saloom Furniture Co., 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 58,008 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 12, 1995) (employees assured that employer had no intention of firing them and that
they were all part of employer's five-year plan received no "absolute guarantee" of job
security).
217. Redgate v. Fairfield Univ., 862 F. Supp. 724, 730-31 (D. Conn. 1994) (a
promise that the employee could have the job "for as long as you want" did not amount
to a clear and definite promise under Connecticut law). Contra Brusilovsky v. Figgie
Int'l, No. 94 C 1506, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7341, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 1995);
Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast I11. Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprentice & Trainee
Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1505-06 (N.D. I11. 1991) (promise, though not clear and
definite enough for contract formation, was sufficiently unambiguous for promissory
estoppel purposes); see also Howard v. Kuehnert, No. 95-APE09-1197, 1996 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1323, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1996) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff on
promissory estoppel grounds where employer dissuaded at-will employee from seeking
employment elsewhere by assurances of job security).
218. Treadwell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 278 (D. Mass.
1987) (misrepresentation claim, statement too vague and general).
219. Wolf v. Buss (Am.), Inc., No. 94 C 902, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1544, at
*17 (N.D. I11. Feb. 7, 1995).
220. Barbuto v. William Backus Hosp., No. 105452, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1184, at *2, *15-16 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1995) (language did not manifest
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full-time, permanent employment"; 2 "I don't see a problem with you
working until you are sixty-five";' "You will retire from this
company";' "You will be the first person to work here for fifty
years";' "You will never have to worry about your job";' "Should
I look for another job?" "No, your job is secure";' "The only person
that can eliminate you is yourself; you have a permanent job. "I
Such assurances instill employee loyalty and commitment to the
job.m Thus, these would appear to be precisely the situations referred
to by Farber and Matheson in their arguments that the appropriate role of
Section 90 is in preserving business relationships involving trust and long
term commitment. 29  And just as obviously, the courts refuse to
enforce these promises, reiterating with monotonous regularity that
reliance on such employer assurances is "unreasonable" and
"unforeseeable" in view of the prevailing at-will employment
assumptions. In other words, employers give oral assurances seeking to
induce reliance, employees predictably rely, and courts dutifully hold the
reliance to be unforeseeable.
If the courts in these decisions were referring to performance
reliance-the employee's reliance on a belief that the employer would do
what he said he would do-then their conclusions would seem
insupportable. Even though a strong presumption favors employment at-
defendant's intention to undertake a contractual commitment to plaintiff).
221. Hutchison v. Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 68521, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
4329, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1995).
222. McCullough v. Avon Lake McDonald's, No. 95CA006066, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3529, at *5 (Ohio Ct: App. Aug. 16, 1995).
223. Enlow v. Empire-Detroit Steel Div., Cyclops Corp., No. 94-CA-80, 1995
Ohio App. LEXIS 3628, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1995).
224. Healey v. Republic Powdered Metals, 619 N.E.2d 1035, 1036 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992) (statement was just speculation about the future).
225. Clipson v. Schlessman, 624 N.E.2d 220, 222, 233 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(statement was not a promise, just a discussion about employee's future).
226. Corradi v. Soclof, No. 67586, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2162, at *9, *14-16
(Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 1995) (affirming summary judgment for defendant, the statement
was not a clear and unambiguous promise of continued employment for a specific period).
Contra Robeson v. Midwest Ford, Inc., No. 94-3405, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24641, at
*1 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 1995) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff; in persuading plaintiff
to decline a competitor's offer of employment, employer assured plaintiff that he would
be employed "as long as they were there").
227. Wilder v. Butler Mfg. Co., 533 N.E.2d 1129, 1130 (11. App. Ct. 1989).
228. It is, incidentally, improbable that the employee/plaintiffs in these cases are
falsifying the evidence: perjurers would allege more legally efficacious promises.
229. Farber & Matheson, Invisible Handshake, supra note 11, at 925-29. These
cases would also seem to fit the requirements of Professor Kostritsky: the parties are
enmeshed in a relationship; they possess different knowledge and status; and the reliance
benefits the promisor. See Kostritsky, A New Theory, supra note 11.
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will in most jurisdictions,' it is difficult to maintain, as the opinions
do, that these statements are not "clear and definite" or
"unambiguous."" Expressions that are far less explicit than these
statements have been held sufficient to create bargain contracts under the
objective theory of contract formation. 2
Nor is it plausible that all of these employers were merely making
general policy noises or speculations about the employees' future rather
than promises. In some cases, no doubt, the employers were simply
giving reassurances designed to make the employees feel appreciated and
secure. These statements may not have been intended to induce any
specific reliance. In other cases, however, the employers both intended,
and were accurately understood, to be making a commitment to their
employees, who were expected to rely upon it. If this seems
unpersuasive, return to that litany of assurances and try the effect of
inserting such statements as "remember that your employment is at-will
and I can fire you at any time" or "don't rely on anything I am telling
you." The resulting dissonance shows that these qualifications are wholly
inconsistent with the assurances given. Yet the opinions cited hold that
employees should have heard these unspoken qualifications when the
assurances were given.
Finally, it is particularly unpersuasive to hold that reliance in such
cases is literally unforeseeable. And if the courts were speaking of pure
230. Judge Posner, in the context of a non-employee claim for promissory
estoppel, acknowledged this animus:
Employment at will (i.e., without a contract of employment) remains the
dominant type of employment relationship in this country, and would be
seriously undermined if employees could use the doctrine of promissory
estoppel to make alleged oral contracts of employment enforceable. Reliance
is easily, perhaps too easily, shown in the employment setting. Agreeing to
work for a particular employer, thereby giving up alternative opportunities for
employment, can easily be described as reliance on the employer's alleged
oral promises concerning the terms of employment.
Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Milazzo v.
O'Connell, 925 F. Supp. 1331, 1340 (N.D. 11. 1996) ("In Illinois oral contracts for
employment are viewed more skeptically than written contracts . . ").
231. This position was forcefully stated by the dissent in Rowe v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991) (Levin, J., dissenting).
232. In the context of a bargain, courts are much more liberal in interpreting the
parties' statements as assent to be contractually bound. E.g., Embry v. Hargadine,
McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (holding as a matter
of law that employer's statement "'[g]o ahead, you're all right[, g]et your men out, and
don't let that worry you'" constituted acceptance of employee's offer to renew his annual
employment agreement) (quoting McKittrick); see also Tiersma, Language of Offer and
Acceptance, supra note 25, at 189 (applying Gricean maxim of relevance to the offeree's
statement makes it interpretable only as an acceptance of the offer).
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performance reliance, then their opinions seem incorrect. But it is not the
performance reliance that the courts are finding to be unforeseeable: it is
the reliance on having a legal claim or remedy that is deemed
unreasonable and unforeseeable in light of the circumstances of the
statements. 33  As is implied by Okun's observations, courts are, in
effect, permitting employers to say "I unenforceably-promise not to
terminate you." The inference is that such non-binding commitments
have some value in the workplace that would be lost if employers could
make no commitment at all, which might result if all such promises were
legally enforceable. 4 The employment cases thus imply that Section
90 is being interpreted to protect only enforcement reliance, leaving non-
legal sanctions to protect performance reliance.
B. Enforcement Reliance Prevented by Disclaimers of Promissory
Liability
While a strong judicial presumption of unenforceability can prevent
enforcement reliance, a more direct way to affect the promisee's
awareness of non-enforceability is for the promisor to make an explicit
disclaimer of liability for any oral promises he may make, either at the
time of the disclaimer or afterward. An explicit disclaimer of liability has
become the conventional defense to Section 90 liability for institutional
promisors, "repeat players" such as employers, franchisors," lending
institutions, and buyers and sellers of businesses. 6  Most courts have
233. Thus, in Latimore-Debose v. BVM Inc., No. 69439, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS
1425, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1996), the court, in denying a claim for promissory
estoppel based on an employee handbook that stated that it did not create a contract, noted
that the employee could not have reasonably relied on terms that were neither contractual
nor binding. The reliance that the court is referring to here is obviously enforcement
reliance rather than performance reliance.
234. Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises, supra note 16 (noting that a cost of
enforcement of non-bargain promises is that risk-averse potential promisors will make
fewer of them, leading to a loss of the utility of beneficial reliance).
235. Adiel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 95 Civ. 0725 (WK), 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13141 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1995) (express contractual power to terminate in
distributorship agreement prevented reasonable reliance on distributor's subsequent oral
promise not to terminate); Nichols Motorcycle Supply v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 913 F.
Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (oral promise not to terminate distributor superseded by
written distributorship agreement permitting termination).
236. One set of commercial promisors that appears to remain subject to Section
90 (or more precisely, Section 87(2)) consists of subcontractors who submit bids for use
in a general contractor's bid. But such subcontractors can avoid liability by expressly
providing that their contract can be withdrawn at any time. Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,
333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958). If they do not include such a disclaimer in their bids,
therefore, it may be because they view their liability under Section 90 as intended.
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given full effect to such disclaimers, whether they precede or follow the
promise. 7  These holdings are premised on an assumption of full and
continuous awareness by the promisee of the legal effect of the
disclaimer.
For example, while negotiating for the acquisition of a corporation,
the parties in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Taco-Tico Acquisition Corp., l s
executed a "non-binding letter of intent" setting forth some of the
proposed terms and providing, among other things, that no party would
be under any legal obligation until a written contract was executed,
notwithstanding any "past, present or future" written or oral
statements. 9  Pending agreement, the buyer undertook to manage the
properties at a nominal fee, alleging that it relied on the seller's
subsequent oral assurances that the acquisition would be completed.
When the deal fell through, the buyer sued on a theory of promissory
estoppel. Reversing a jury verdict for the buyer, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that, as a matter of law, the buyer could not rely on any
promise made by the seller after the buyer had signed the letter
agreement.m The court emphasized that both parties were
"experienced, successful businessmen who were advised by capable
237. But see Shelley v. Trafalgar House Pub. Ltd. Co., 918 F. Supp. 515, 522-23
(D.P.R. 1996) (although joint venture agreement stated that it was not binding and did not
create a contract, venturer's promise created obligation to bargain in good faith
enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel).
238. 454 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
239. Id. at 790. The provision in question is a masterpiece of prophylactic
drafting:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing .. .or any other past, present or future
written or oral indications of assent or indications of results of negotiation or
agreement to some or all matters then under negotiation, it is agreed that no
party to the proposed transaction (and no person or entity related to any such
party) will be under any legal obligation with respect to the proposed
transaction or any similar transaction, and no offer, commitment, estoppel,
undertaking or obligation of any nature whatsoever shall be implied in fact,
law or equity, unless and until a formal agreement providing for the
transaction containing in detailed legal form terms, conditions, representations
and warranties (secured by an appropriate escrow) has been executed and
delivered by all parties intended to be bound. This paragraph sets forth the
entire understanding and agreement of the parties (and all related persons and
entities) with regard to the subject matter of this paragraph and supersedes all
prior and contemporaneous agreements, arrangements and understandings
related thereto. This paragraph may be amended, modified, superseded or
cancelled only by a written instrument which specifically states that it amends
this paragraph, executed by an authorized officer of each entity to be bound
thereby."
Id. at 790 (quoting letter of intent) (omission by court).
240. Id. at 791.
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attorneys""' and who must be deemed to have understood the letter.
The literal effect of the disclaimer was thus to insulate the seller from
liability for any promises or factual representations 2 that it might
thereafter make during the course of the negotiation. By preventing
enforcement reliance on any other promise, such a provision forecloses
any but the formal contract route to legal liability.3
Similarly, in Puri v. Blockbuster Music Retail' during
negotiations over a commercial lease, the potential lessee's attorney told
the lessor that the lease terms had been approved and that he considered
the lease agreement to be fully executed and enforceable.245 He
instructed the lessor to begin constructing improvements on the leased
premises and the lessor complied. The proposed written lease that the
parties had been exchanging, however, provided that it was not to be
effective until executed by all parties and that agents had no power to
bind the parties.2' After the lessor had incurred construction expense
in complying with the attorney's request, the lessee terminated
negotiations and denied any liability on the lease. The lessor sued under
Section 90, seeking recovery of the expense. The court held that the
execution proviso prevented any estoppel from arising because it rendered
the lessor's reliance on the subsequent oral statement unreasonable as a
matter of law. 7  The lessor's reliance was thus held to be
241. Id.
242. See also Banque Franco-Hellenic de Commerce Int'l et Maritime v.
Christophides, 905 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (enforcing a written disclaimer of
liability for fraudulent misrepresentations in a lender liability lawsuit), vacated, 106 F.3d
22 (2d Cir. 1997).
243. It is noteworthy that the provision in question in W.R. Grace failed to keep
the issue from the jury despite its admirable comprehensiveness.
244. No. 95 C 50018, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18819 (N.D. I11. Dec. 20, 1995).
245. Id. at *5.
246. The relevant lease provision provided:
"ARTICLE 56[.] PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS[.] The submission of
this lease form by Tenant for examination does not constitute an offer to lease
or a reservation of an option to lease. In addition, Landlord and Tenant
acknowledge that neither of them shall be bound by the representations,
promises or preliminary negotiations with respect to the Demised Premises
made by their respective employees or agents. It is their intention that neither
party be legally bound in any way until this Lease has been fully executed by
both Landlord and Tenant."
Id. at *3 (quoting lease). These terms were confirmed by the cover letter sent by the




"unforeseeable" by the promisor, even though the promisor expressly
requested that reliance.48
If the reliance referred to by the Puri court was performance
reliance, then its conclusion would be untenable. The lessor's reliance
was requested, so surely it was foreseeable. And whether it was
reasonable to rely on the likelihood that the prospective tenant would
perform its promise cannot be a question of law because it depends on the
factual basis of the expectation that the lessee would in fact honor its
attorney's promise. Only if the court is referring to enforcement reliance
does Puri make sense. The lessor could not reasonably believe that it had
received an enforceable promise without some basis for believing that the
agreed execution proviso had been nullified.
The decisions occasionally allude to the difference between
enforcement reliance and performance reliance. In Rennick v.
O.P.T.LO.N. Care, Inc.," the plaintiffs failed to establish a Section
90 claim of a promise to issue a franchise because the letter of intent on
which the claim was based specifically stated that it did not create a
binding obligation. The plaintiffs argued that they had relied on oral
promises preceding the letter and on the defendant's handshake as
assurance that the franchise would be issued. The Ninth Circuit held that
the reliance was unreasonable in light of the express language of the letter
of intent:
In light of the unequivocal nonbinding language in the letter of
intent, reliance on the existence of a contract was unreasonable
as a matter of law. The July 3 meeting and the letter of intent
might have made [the plaintiffs'] actions prudent as a matter of
business judgment, in contemplation of a probable contract, but
they could not control whether the reliance would be reasonable
for purposes of binding O.P.T.I.O.N. to a contract to which it
expressly had as yet refused to agree [sic] .0
The performance reliance may have been "prudent as a matter of
business judgment" even though the statements and the handshake did not
create grounds for enforcement reliance. The court seems to acknowledge
that there is a place for performance reliance upon the unenforceable
commercial promise or assurance.
248. Cf. Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, 452 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that
landlord may recover in quantum meruit for the cost of alterations made pursuant to an
oral lease, though a claim for breach of lease is barred by the Statute of Frauds).
249. 77 F.3d 309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 174 (1996).
250. Id. at 317.
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In employment law, the employee handbook has evolved from being
a possible source of contractual rights"' to being a barrier to their
assertion. Disclaimers in handbooks or separate documents signed by the
employees are now widely used by employers to bar claims of non-
terminable, or continued, employment. z2 Though employees are rarely
"experienced, successful businessmen represented by capable attorneys,"
these written at-will agreements and handbook disclaimers usually prevent
employers' subsequent, oral promises of job security from giving rise to
liability under Section 90.3 Once the disclaimer is made, the employer
can make reliance-inducing, unenforceable promises.
C. Enforcement Reliance Prevented by the Promisee's Knowledge of
Legal Rules Concerning Enforceability
Even in cases in which the promisor does not expressly disclaim an
intention to be legally bound, a promisee may be unreasonable in relying
on its legal enforceability. Many courts will find enforcement reliance
unforeseeable in the absence of an affirmative manifestation of intention
251. See Richard Harrison Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-
At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196 (1985) (analysis of employee handbooks as
unilateral contracts); see also Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880
(Mich. 1980); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985).
252. A typical example of a disclaimer signed at the time of employment and of
a handbook disclaimer can be found in Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 709
(Wyo. 1996). The disclaimer provided as follows:
"In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and
regulations of the Company and that my employment and compensation can
be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time,
at the option of either the Company or me. I understand that no employee,
manager, or other agent of the Company other than the President of the
Company, has any authority to enter into any agreement for employment for
any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the
foregoing. Any amendment to the foregoing must be in writing and signed
by the President."
Id. (quoting employment application disclaimer). The handbook provided:
"The language used in this handbook is not intended to create, nor is it to be
construed to constitute, a contract between the Company and any one or all
of its employees. You have been hired as an at will employee, and just as
you may voluntarily leave at any time, your employment and compensation
may be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any
time by the Company in its sole discretion. There are no promises, express
or implied, for continued employment, and no one except the Board of
Directors of the Company is authorized to waive or modify these conditions
of employment."
Id. (quoting employment handbook).
253. See supra note 109.
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to be legally bound, even when the promisor deliberately induces reliance.
For example, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v.
Varadian,2 the counterclaimants in an action on a promissory note
claimed the plaintiff bank breached an oral contract to lend an additional
$43.5 million for a construction project. In answer to special
interrogatories, the jury found that (1) the counterclaimants knew the bank
intended to be bound only by an agreement in writing for the construction
loan, but also (2) the bank did make the oral loan promise intending to
induce reliance by the counterclaimants, and (3) they reasonably relied on
the promise by executing the note and guarantee on which the bank had
sued.'5  Following a jury verdict in the counterclaimants' favor, the
trial court entered judgment against the counterclaimants on their contract
claim but in their favor on their promissory estoppel claim.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the
promissory estoppel judgment on the grounds that, given the finding that
the counterclaimants understood the bank's intention not to be legally
bound, they could not have understood the bank's statement to have been
a "promise," in the sense of a commitment. 25 It also concluded that
any reliance by the counterclaimants, experienced businessmen, on such
a non-contractual "promise" would be unreasonable and unforeseeable as
a matter of law.57
If one interprets Section 90 to protect what I have called performance
reliance, then the court begged the essential question. Given findings 2
and 3 (intent to induce reliance and actual reliance), it follows that the
jury was wrong as a matter of law in finding 1 (no intent to be legally
bound). If all parties were aware of Section 90 at the time of the oral
promise, then the promisor's intention to be legally bound under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel was manifested by its intentional
inducement of the promisees' reliance. Varadian, however, rests on the
principle that Section 90 cannot establish contract liability unless the
promisor manifests an intention to be legally bound by some means other
than by intentionally making a reliance-inducing promise.
Varadian contradicts the traditional, performance reliance protection
version of Section 90. The text of Section 90 does not require that the
254. 647 N.E.2d 1174 (Mass. 1995).
255. Id. at 1175-76.
256. Id. at 1179. Relying on earlier precedent, the court explained, "' [a] promise
made with an understood intention that it is not to be legally binding, but only expressive
of a present intention, is not a contract.'" Id. (quoting Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co.,
115 N.E.2d 461, 463 (Mass. 1953)) (alteration in original).
257. Id.; see also Pacesetter Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp., 913 F. Supp. 174,
183 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (reliance on oral financing commitment unreasonable where
plaintiffs were experienced businessmen).
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promisor manifest an intention to be legally bound; the only intention that
Section 90 seems to require of the promisor is the intention that the
promise induce the promisee to rely on the promise."8 Yet the jury in
Varadian found that the promisor had this intention and that the promisee
did so rely. The Varadian court, however, defined "promise" for Section
90 purposes as a statement that both parties reasonably understand as a
commitment to be legally bound, a narrower definition than that contained
in the Restatement. 9 Varadian suggests that Section 90 enforcement
will be limited to those cases in which the promisor expressly states an
intention to be legally bound by the promise.'
The promisees in Varadian had reason to believe that the bank did
not intend to make a legally binding commitment based on their dealings
with the bank. Some courts find the "fatal knowledge" that bars
enforcement reliance in the commercial promisee's general familiarity
with business practice of formalizing serious agreements. A commercial
promisor's failure to formalize even a serious, reliance-inducing promise
may defeat the promisee's effort to establish enforcement reliance. Thus,
in Thatcher's Drug Store of West Goshen v. Consolidated
Supermiarkets,26' a drug store owner was considering whether to relocate
its business or to renew a commercial lease in a space adjacent to that
leased by a supermarket. The lease agreement did not restrict the
supermarket from entering the pharmacy business and the drug store was
concerned about the possibility that the supermarket would begin
competing in the retail drug business. Before renewing the lease, the
drug store owner obtained an oral assurance from the supermarket owner
that it had no intention of operating a competing pharmacy at that
location. Soon after the drug store had renewed its lease, however, the
258. See Slawson, Role of Reliance, supra note 75, at 208-09 (criticizing Barnett's
consent theory for confusing intention to be legally bound with intention that the promisee
rely on the promise, which Slawson contends, correctly in my view, is the relevant
intention for Section 90 purposes). Slawson's argument is consistent with the
Restatement, which takes the position that liability under Section 90 does not depend on
mutual assent. See supra note 203.
259. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2(1) ("A promise is a manifestation
of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."); Id. § 2 cmt. a (word
"promise" is not limited to contracts).
260. Even in these cases, a court might deny enforcement if it concludes, as did
the court in Varadian, that the legally sophisticated promisee should recognize the promise
as unenforceable. If so, Section 90 cannot be deliberately used in contract formation.
See, e.g., Triax Pac., Inc. v. American Ins. Co., No. 94-4091, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
31097, at *19-21 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995) (unenforceable commercial promise that
induced reliance).
261. 636 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1994).
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supermarket began preparing to operate a pharmacy. Reversing a trial
court order enjoining the competitor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the drug store's reliance on the assurance was unreasonable as
a matter of law, and that enforcement of the promise was therefore not
necessary to avoid injustice. The court explained:
In view of the relationship between the parties and the
nature and duration of the promise, any agreement not to
compete should have been formalized. Proceeding in such a
manner would have memorialized the occasion and reduced the
possibility that the terms of the agreement would be
misunderstood. As a business entity operating in the
commercial setting, Thatcher's showed poor judgment when it
decided to renew its ten-year lease and forgo its opportunity to
relocate on the basis of an indefinitely worded promise uttered
in an informal conversation with a potential competitor.2
The court also found that enforcement of such oral promises would
not advance the evidentiary, cautionary, and deterrent functions normally
served by a writing.' Thatcher's seems to signal a judicial refusal to
enforce serious commercial promises in the absence of contract formalities
on the basis that prudent, experienced businesspeople normally do not rely
on such promises in conducting their affairs.
Enforcement reliance becomes especially difficult to demonstrate in
cases involving promisees who are attorneys and others who are aware of
the rules of formal contract formation. Several courts in the sample held
that even expressly requested reliance was legally unforeseeable if the
promisee's education or experience made her aware that the
accompanying promise was otherwise unenforceable as a bargain
contract.' For example, in Harkinson v. Trammell Crow Co.,' a
262. Id. at 160-61.
263. Id. at 161.
264. Shawmut Bank Conn., N.A. v. L & R Realty Co., Nos. 523134, 522814,
1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1853 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20, 1995) (attorney's reliance on
oral promise that he would have advised a client to get in writing was unreasonable;
promise to subordinate mortgage conflicted with written contract); State v. Law Offices
of Donald W. Belveal, 663 So. 2d 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (attorney had no right
to rely on a state official's oral promise to renew a contract with the state that contained
no right to renew); Edmondson v. Zetusky, 674 A.2d 760, 765 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)
(employee could not as a matter of law justifiably rely on a promise that the public official
had no statutory right to make); Harkinson v. Trammell Crow Co., 915 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1995) (real estate broker could not recover under Section 90 on oral broker's
contract because he should have known that it did not comply with the requirement that
such agreements be in writing); Brah v. Bence, 532 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
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real estate broker was denied recovery under quantum meruit principles
for breach of an oral listing agreement. In denying recovery under
Section 90, the court held that, as a result of licensing procedures, the
broker was charged with knowledge of the regulatory statute requiring all
brokerage contracts to be in writing, and that reliance on a payment
promise in the face of such legal knowledge was unreasonable as a matter
of law.'
This ruling would be difficult to justify if Section 90 protected
performance reliance. The broker might well have had adequate reason
to believe in the likelihood that the customer would perform. In that
sense, the reliance was not "unreasonable" as described by the court.
What was unreasonable was the broker's expectation of a legal remedy in
the event of breach. One can infer that no assurance by the seller short
of compliance with the statute's requirements would have satisfied the
court's reading of Section 90. Other decisions impute knowledge of
relevant statutes of frauds to parties who are found to have been legally
represented, with the result that reliance on oral promises is found to be
insufficient under Section 90.26 These cases too seem to exclude the
possibility that the parties might reasonably believe the promise to be
enforceable solely under the principles of Section 90.
The trend toward enforcement reliance is not universal. Some courts
have enforced promises under Section 90 that legally aware promisees
would have known were unenforceable under contract law principles.2'
(broker could not recover on oral promise to extend written real estate contract because
broker was familiar with the requirement that such agreements be in writing). But see Lo
Bosco v. Kure Eng'g, 891 F. Supp. 1020 (D.N.J. 1995) (plaintiff attorney definitely and
substantially relied on oral promise of employment by surrendering old job, and reliance
was not unreasonable because of attorney's sophistication).
265. 915 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd in part, 944 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.
1997) (finding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not provide an exception to the
Real Estate License Act's requirement of written commission agreement).
266. See id.; accord Brah v. Bence, 532 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
267. E.g., Ceres Ill., Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing, 500 N.E.2d 1, 7 (11. 1986)
(refusing to enforce a 15-year oral lease under Section 90, despite landlord's active
encouragement of tenant's significant reliance and occupancy, because the parties were
sophisticated businesspeople who should have known that the lease would not be
enforceable unless in writing). In the case of less sophisticated parties, this rule may be
relaxed, however. See, e.g., Michael K. Sutley, P.A. v. Selchow, No. C9-95-860, 1996
Minn. App. LEXIS 4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 1996) (plaintiff reasonably relied on
defendant's promise to reduce oral agreement to writing and to sign it, estopping
defendant from pleading statute of frauds).
268. E.g., Cameron Manor, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 681 A.2d 836
(Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1996) (health services provider that was decertified and ineligible for
state reimbursement for services could recover under a theory of equitable estoppel where
it had provided services at the state's request and on assurance that it would be
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For example, courts have enforced promises under Section 90 in
situations in which the original contract was unenforceable because of
failure to agree on essential terms.' In Neiss v. Ehlers, discussed
above in Part III.A, the parties entered into a written agreement that
plaintiff would work as an optometrist in defendant's practice for a year,
after which plaintiff would be entitled to purchase stock in the defendant's
professional corporation on terms to be agreed upon later. When the
agreement failed, the court permitted plaintiff to sue for reliance damages
incurred in beginning business operations under the agreement. Neiss
follows a long line of classic Section 90 cases that protect reliance on
commercial agreements that sophisticated promisees would have realized
were unenforceable as contracts.2' But Neiss is not necessarily
inconsistent with the enforcement reliance requirement if the assumptions
about the parties' legal awareness are relaxed. The formalized written
agreement that created the parties' relationship may have been seen by the
court as an attempt to create a legal obligation. If so, then the failure to
specify the terms of the ultimate exchange so as to justify an award of
expectation damages did not prevent the court from awarding a reliance-
based remedy. Had the parties to the original agreement foreseen the
possibility of failing to agree, they might well have agreed to such a
remedy.
A second case that appears not to hold a commercial promisee to a
high standard of legal awareness is Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Systems
Development.27' Pending negotiations for the purchase of computer
components, the purchaser urged the manufacturer to begin work in
developing the product. When the negotiations ultimately failed because
the parties could not agree on material terms of the contract, the
manufacturer sued to recover the expense incurred in reliance on the
buyer's request. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the
manufacturer had no claim for breach of contract because the parties
reimbursed).
269. Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1983); Vigoda v. Denver
Urban Renewal Auth., 646 P.2d 900, 905 (Colo. 1982); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133
N.W.2d 267, 274-75 (Wis. 1965); see also Henderson, Promissory Estoppel, supra note
2, at 361 ("Section 90 is also being used as a basis for enforcement of promises which
under traditional theory would be held indefinite and hence unenforceable."). Contra Keil
v. Glacier Park, Inc., 614 P.2d 502, 506-07 (Mont. 1980); Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 389 N.W.2d 352, 357 (N.D. 1986).
270. See Neiss v. Ehlers, 899 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); see also Beal Corp.
Liquidating Trust .v. Valleylab, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Colo. 1996); Smith v.
Horsehead Indus., Nos. 90 Civ. 6993 (SAS), 90 Civ. 7006 (SAS), 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9549 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1995); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965);
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
271. 47 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995).
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never agreed on essential terms concerning price and because it would
have been unreasonable to rely on the documents that the parties had
exchanged as establishing an enforceable agreement.'r The appellate
court, however, affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, granting reliance
expenses under the doctrine of promissory estoppel even though the
purchaser had refused to put its commitment in writing.'m The court
based its ruling on the fact that the purchaser had repeatedly told the
manufacturer to proceed, insisting that the manufacturer was contractually
obligated to do so and assuring it that the negotiation problem would be
resolved.274 The buyer's reference to the seller's obligation to perform
and its assurance of the execution of the agreement show that Cyberchron
is consistent with the idea that the promisor must manifest some intention
that its promise be legally enforceable.
D. Section 90 as Catch-22
"Is Orr crazy?"
"He sure is, "Doc Daneeka said.
"Can you ground him?"
"I sure can. But first he has to ask me to. That's part of
the rule."
"Then why doesn't he ask you to?"
"Because he's crazy, " Doc Daneeka said. "He has to be
crazy to keep flying combat missions after all the close calls he's
had. Sure, I can ground Orr. But first he has to ask me to."
"That's all he has to do to be grounded?"
"That's all. Let him ask me."
"And then you can ground him?" Yossarian asked.
"No. Then I can't ground him."
"You mean there's a catch?"
"Sure there's a catch, "Doc Daneeka replied. "Catch-22.
Anyone who wants to get out of combat duty isn't really crazy."
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which
specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of
dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a
rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he
had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer
272. Id. at 43. The provision in the purchase order providing for reimbursement
of seller's expense was subject to unilateral deletion by the buyer. The court held that the
purchase order never became binding by its terms, and that even if it had, reliance on this
provision would have been unreasonable. Id.
273. Id. at 44.
274. Id. at 44-45.
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be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be
crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he was
sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and
didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to.
Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of
this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.
"That's some catch, that Catch-22, " he observed.
"It's the best there is, "Doc Daneeka agreed.275
The strongest argument against the new requirement of enforcement
reliance is that it may become the Catch-22 of Section 90. The legally
sophisticated commercial actor who receives a non-bargain, commercial
promise would find herself more or less in Orr's situation. If she is
sufficiently aware of Section 90 to rely on the enforceability of the
promise, then she must also be aware of the consideration doctrine and
the statute of frauds and so must know that the promise is unenforceable.
If so, she cannot reasonably or foreseeably rely on its enforceability and
enforcement would not be necessary to avoid injustice. Conversely, if
she has a well-founded reason to believe that the promise is enforceable
as a bargain promise, so that she could demonstrate foreseeable
enforcement reliance under Section 90, then she has no need of Section
90 to "prevent injustice" because she will have a valid claim for breach
of contract. (Pause for respectful whistle.)
One way out of the dilemma is to interpret Section 90 solely to
protect promisees who are mistaken about whether the promise is
enforceable, a role that might have made sense in the family promise
context.276 But applying this doctrine in a commercial context is highly
problematic. ,Which mistakes should the court protect? Which
misconceptions about law are "reasonable" or "foreseeable?" Why
should this doctrine protect ill-informed commercial promisees and not ill-
informed promisors? Using Section 90 to correct mistakes of law by
commercial promisees would introduce a spectacular degree of uncertainty
into commercial communications with no obvious gain in utility.
The only way that Section 90 can avoid becoming Catch-22 is by
judicial recognition of a new mode of creating enforceable, non-bargain
promises. If Section 90 is used to enforce only those promises that the
promisee reasonably expects to be enforceable, then the promisee's
expectation of enforceability must somehow arise both outside the rules
of bargain contract and from some basis other than the simple fact that the
275. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 45-46 (Random House 1961).
276. See Randy Barnett, ... And Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
421, 431 (1993); Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra note 11, at 463-66.
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promise has induced performance reliance. The leading candidate for
such a role has already been suggested by Barnett's consent theory: an
expression by the promisor that the promise is intended to be legally
enforceable. A non-bargain promise accompanied by such an expression
and followed by reliance would justify enforcement. The promisee's
expectation of enforcement (not just performance) would be produced by
the expression of the promisor, not by application of other rules of
contract formation or by Section 90 itself.
The parties expressed an intention that a non-bargain promise be
binding in Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Margaux, Inc.2' During
negotiations over the proposed sale of Margaux, the parties executed a
letter of intent expressing their understanding that Kysor would make an
offer for Margaux. The letter contained a "no-shop" agreement intended
to encourage Kysor to incur the expense of a due diligence review of
Margaux before making a firm offer.27 This agreement required
Margaux to pay Kysor its due diligence expenses plus a "termination fee"
of $300,000 if Margaux negotiated with any other buyer within a four
month period or if it failed to approve the transaction after Kysor made
its offer.2' The agreement also stated that except for the no-shop and
termination fee promises, it was not intended to create any binding
obligations .'
277. 674 A.2d 889 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996).
278. The no-shop provision was as follows:
"CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS[.]
1. For a period of 120 days from the date of this letter, Margaux shall
not, directly or indirectly, solicit or entertain offers from, negotiate with or
in any manner encourage, discuss, accept or otherwise consider any proposal
of any person other than Kysor to acquire capital stock of Margaux, or any
of its assets or business, in whole or in part, regardless of the form of
transaction (other than sales of inventory in the ordinary course)."
Id. at 892 (quoting letter of intent).
279. The provisions stated:
"2. In the event that Margaux breaches its undertakings under the
foregoing paragraph of this section, if the Board of Directors of Margaux fails
to approve the contemplated transaction's or withdraws its approval, or if the
transactions are not approved by Margaux's stockholders, Margaux shall
promptly: (a) reimburse Kysor for all expenses incurred in connection with the
transaction, including without limitation, its due diligence expenses and the
fees and expenses of its professional advisors, and (b) pay as liquidated
damages to Kysor a termination fee equal to Three Hundred Thousand Dollars
($300,000)."
Id. at 892-93 (quoting letter of intent).
280. The provisions continued:
"The purpose of this letter is to state our present intentions with respect to the
proposed transaction. Except for the provisions set forth under the heading
'Certain Undertakings' above (as to which provisions this letter constitutes our
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Margaux breached by selling to a third party during the four month
period and Kysor sued to recover its expenses and the termination fee,
arguing both breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Margaux
argued that its promises were not supported by consideration, because the
letter of intent did not obligate Kysor in any way. The court, incorrectly
in my opinion, found that the letter of intent was a "unilateral contract"
that became binding when Kysor began its due diligence inquiry." It
thus did not reach the promissory estoppel issue.
Kysor might better have been based on a finding that the defendant
expressed an intention to be bound to a non-bargain commercial promise
that induced reliance on its enforceability. By stating that its payment
obligations were binding, Margaux induced Kysor to give enforcement
reliance rather than mere performance reliance on its no-shop promise.
In contrast to the promisor in Varadian, Margaux deliberately chose the
higher level of obligation afforded by enforceability and the court
properly respected that choice.
It is also likely that commercial parties express an intention to be
bound in certain cases in which their non-bargain promises are formalized
or are modifications to an existing, already binding contract.'
The problem, of course, with such a rule is as always the problem
of interpretation. Something more than making a performance reliance-
inducing promise must count as an expression of an intention to be legally
bound. Some courts claim to find enforcement reliance without clearly
explaining how the expectation of enforceability arose. In Omega
Engineering v. Eastman Kodak Co., 3 Omega sued Eastman for
discontinuing a line of batteries that Omega had been purchasing for use
in its products. Omega claimed that Eastman had made oral commitments
to continue to supply Omega's requirements of the batteries. Although
the court held that the alleged promises were unenforceable as contracts
agreement), this letter does not constitute a legally binding agreement between
us or obligate either of us with respect to the proposed transaction and no such
agreement or obligation shall exist unless and until we execute a mutually
acceptable definitive purchase agreement."
Id. at 893 (quoting letter of intent) (emphasis added).
281. The letter of intent is not an offer for a unilateral contract that can be
accepted by Kysor's performance of an action (the due diligence review) as the court
found because the agreement does not condition Margaux's duty to pay on Kysor's actual
performance of any investigation. Kysor might instead have argued that the termination
fee agreement is implicitly an offer for a unilateral contract of the unusual form "if you
will make an offer in a given amount, I will promise either to accept it or to pay
$300,000." The court did not rest its decision on this reading, however.
282. See Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance, supra note 11, at 460-63.
283. 908 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Conn. 1995).
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because of failure to satisfy the Article 2 Statute of Frauds,' it refused
to grant defendant summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim,
reasoning that the alleged promises "'manifested a present intention...
to undertake immediate contractual obligations . . . . " While the
court did not address the reasonableness of Omega's reliance on oral
promises it should have known were unenforceable as contracts, the
opinion implies that knowledge of unenforceability as a bargain contract
does not bar a claim under Section 90.26 Had it emphasized the
parties' legal sophistication, it might have concluded that the promisor did
not manifest an intention to undertake contractual obligations because of
its failure to sign a written contract.
V. CONCLUSION: THE TINY FUTURE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Promissory estoppel has not even unsettled "classical" bargain
contract theory, much less led to its death. Instead, in the more general
struggle between contract and tort law, formal contract is proving to be
the more robust competitor. Sophisticated commercial
promisors-employers, banks, franchisors, insurers, and other
businesspeople-have learned how to avoid the risk of Section 90 liability.
Having invoked the disclaimer shield, they become free to induce
performance reliance by making unenforceable promises. Essential to
their success has been a growing judicial consensus that Section 90
liability, unlike tort liability, must be deliberately incurred; that the
promisor must not only make a promise but must also manifest an
intention to be legally bound by the promise; that the promisee must not
only have a reasonable expectation of performance but must also have an
expectation of legal enforceability arising from some source outside
Section 90 before her reliance will be protected under Section 90; and
that it is not unjust to deny enforcement to a commercial promisee who
relied without a reasonable expectation of a legal remedy for breach.
The rule of presumptive liability for commercial promises proposed
by the dominant legal theories would impose needless transaction costs.
The ubiquity of deliberate, formalized strategies to avoid Section 90
284. Id. at 1090-91.
285. Id. at 1092 (quoting D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame
High Sch., 520 A.2d 217, 221-22 (Conn. 1987)). Courts in other jurisdictions have held
that promissory estoppel cannot enforce an oral contract falling within the Article 2 statute
of frauds, U.C.C. § 2-201, on the basis that the statute's specific enumeration of reliance-
based exceptions precludes the use of estoppel to create others. E.g., Lige Dickson Co.
v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103 (Wash. 1981).




demonstrates that well-advised, repeat players will contract around the
risk. Thus, the problem is one of selecting a default rule for purposes of
deciding about the enforceability of promises lacking either an assurance
of enforceability or a disclaimer of it. Given the interest of all
commercial parties in making and recognizing enforceable promises, one
would expect that our legal system would have provided more useful
channeling resources. Roman law recognized contracts created by a
specific verbal formula, which satisfied the causa requirement that we
later came to call consideration. Negotiating for a legally binding
contract, the promisee would ask "Spondesne ... ?" [Do you promise?]
to which the promisor would respond "Spondeo . . ." [I promise], each
phrase being followed by a description of the promised performance.'
These sentences being uttered, the contract became a legally binding
obligation."s
In the "heaven of legal concepts," commercial actors would not
simply "promise": they would "enforceably-promise" or "unenforceably-
promise," spondeo or non-spondeo, promisees would rely accordingly,
and contract law could be taught in one semester. In the absence of new
verb-forms, it would seem that the courts are imposing a default rule of
interpretation favoring "unenforceably-promise" on claims arising under
Section 90. That approach has the merit of according with what appears
to be the most common intention of commercial promisors. If courts
were to adopt expressly the rule that commercial promises must be
accompanied by a statement of intention to be bound in order to be
enforceable under Section 90, they could more candidly acknowledge the
existence of performance reliance. They could stop referring to promisee
performance reliance as unreasonable or unforeseeable-it is neither-and
could say more accurately that it is no justification for legal enforcement.
287. See J.A.C. THOMAS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY 207-08 (1975); J.A.C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 217
(1976); P. VAN WARMELO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN CIVIL
LAW 148, 161-62 (1976).
288. On the movement from formalism to natural law in the Roman system, see
POUND, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 161, at 139-40.
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